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Islamic Law and Constitution-Making: The Authoritarian Temptation 
and the Arab Spring  





The political dynamics that have characterized post-Mubarak Egypt have often been 
understood to be a battle between "religious" forces, represented by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its supporters, and "secularist" forces, represented by a diverse group of 
civil society actors. Opposition of this latter group to the "religious" politics of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is therefore understood to be the primary cause of the events that led to the 
July 3, 2013 military coup that overthrew Egypt's only freely elected President, Mohammed 
Morsi.  Without denying the salience of a religious-secularist divide in Egypt, this narrative 
of post-Mubarak politics fails to appreciate the importance of intra-Muslim religious 
division regarding the proper place of Islam in the Egyptian political order, and its 
relationship to the state.  This paper argues that traditionalist Egyptian religious scholars 
have a normative commitment to political authoritarianism that is tied to their 
understanding that the only proper modes of religious instruction is through adherence to 
a tradition of learning, and a conception of religion as something that exists outside of, but 
ultimately, is responsible for directing the state through the cooperation of the pious 
autocrat. The Muslim Brotherhood, and their supporters, on the other hand, view religious 
authority as a kind of resource that any person can acquire with sufficient diligence, and 
accordingly, can be incorporated within a democratic polity by cultivating a religiously-
minded citizenry.  I trace the normative resources for both positions in the Sunni tradition 
and then illustrate why those debates can cast light on the important political differences 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Azhar, even though they may be in agreement on 
a broad array of substantive questions. 
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When	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Fattah	  al-­‐Sisi,	  then	  the	  Egyptian	  Defense	  Minister,	  announced	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  military	  
had	  removed	  Egypt’s	  first	  democratically-­‐elected	  President,	  Mohamed	  Morsi,	  he	  was	  flanked	  by	  the	  
heads	  of	  Egypt’s	  twin	  religious	  establishments	  –	  the	  Shaykh	  of	  al-­‐Azhar,	  Ahmad	  	  al-­‐Tayyib,	  and	  the	  Pope	  
of	  Coptic	  Church,	  Tawadrus	  II	  –	  and	  the	  head	  of	  the	  ultra-­‐conservative	  Salafist	  religious	  party,	  Yasir	  
Burhami.	  	  The	  sight	  of	  these	  religious	  heavyweights	  at	  the	  side	  of	  the	  military	  strongman	  and	  other	  
senior	  members	  of	  Egypt’s	  armed	  forces	  announcing	  a	  coup	  against	  a	  democratically-­‐elected	  president	  
who	  himself	  represented	  a	  religious-­‐political	  social	  movement	  –	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  –	  might	  come	  
as	  something	  of	  a	  surprise	  to	  those	  observers	  of	  Egyptian	  politics	  who	  had	  reduced	  post-­‐Mubarak	  
political	  conflict	  to	  a	  struggle	  between	  theocrats	  and	  secular	  democrats.	  	  The	  symbolism	  of	  the	  July	  3	  
coup,	  as	  well	  as	  subsequent	  developments	  in	  post-­‐Morsi	  Egypt,	  both	  make	  clear	  that	  contesting	  
theocratic	  conceptions	  of	  religion	  and	  state	  are	  as	  much	  at	  stake	  as	  an	  alleged	  conflict	  between	  secular	  
democracy,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  theocracy,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  One	  of	  these	  theocratic	  conceptions	  vests	  
the	  people	  with	  the	  responsibility	  for	  articulating	  and	  implementing	  divine	  law,	  while	  the	  other	  vests	  
this	  power	  in	  a	  paternalistic	  condominium	  between	  the	  holders	  of	  coercive	  power	  and	  the	  possessors	  of	  
religious	  authority.	  	  	  
When	  discussing	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  termed	  “political	  Islam,”	  
commentators	  have	  generally	  been	  most	  interested	  in	  exploring	  the	  political	  thought	  of	  groups	  such	  as	  
the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  whose	  politics,	  while	  theocratic,	  also	  aspires	  to	  certain	  republican	  ideals	  of	  
self-­‐government,	  broad-­‐based	  participation,	  and	  establishing	  accountability	  through	  competitive	  
elections.1	  	  Far	  less	  attention,	  however,	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  continued	  vitality	  of	  traditionalist	  
conceptions	  of	  religion	  and	  politics	  in	  Sunni	  thought,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  official	  religious	  
establishments	  found	  in	  various	  Muslim-­‐majority	  states.	  	  This	  oversight	  is	  particularly	  damaging	  to	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  religion	  to	  the	  state	  in	  Egypt,	  where	  the	  state	  nationalized	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	   See,	  for	  example,	  Carrie	  Rosefsky	  Wickham,	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood:	  Evolution	  of	  an	  Islamist	  Movement	  
(Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Jeffrey	  R.	  Halverson,	  Theology	  and	  Creed	  in	  Sunni	  Islam	  (New	  York:	  
Palgrave-­‐MacMillan,	  2010),	  p.	  75	  (attributing	  to	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  the	  1980s	  the	  
view	  that	  “Islamic	  government	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  civil	  government	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  consent	  and	  support	  of	  the	  
people”);	  see	  generally,	  Chapters	  3	  &	  4.	  	  This	  is	  of	  course	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  has	  an	  internally	  
coherent	  view	  on	  democracy,	  even	  one	  within	  an	  explicitly	  Islamic	  reference.	  	  Wickham’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  
contradictions	  that	  the	  embrace	  of	  party	  politics	  in	  the	  1980s	  imposed	  upon	  the	  Brotherhood	  in	  Chapter	  3	  of	  her	  
book	  is	  especially	  helpful	  in	  highlighting	  the	  internal	  divisions	  between	  the	  Muslim	  Brothers	  over	  whether	  their	  




institution	  of	  al-­‐Azhar	  and	  expanded	  it	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  appropriate	  religion	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  governance.2	  	  
The	  intellectual	  bias	  of	  political	  scientists,	  theorists	  and	  lawyers	  toward	  groups	  like	  the	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood,	  which	  are	  the	  product	  of	  modernizing	  reformist	  movements,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  
political	  thought	  of	  establishment	  religious	  intellectuals,	  may	  very	  well	  be	  the	  reflection	  of	  the	  modern	  
conceit	  that	  Muslim	  religious	  modernists	  are	  destined	  to	  triumph	  over	  religious	  traditionalists,	  all	  as	  part	  
of	  an	  inevitable	  march	  toward	  a	  more	  liberal	  (and	  secular)	  future.	  	  	  
In	  short,	  the	  battle	  that	  is	  currently	  playing	  out	  in	  Egypt	  is	  not	  only	  between	  those	  who	  would	  
like	  to	  a	  see	  a	  secular	  Egypt	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  more	  religious	  one,	  but	  it	  is	  also,	  and	  maybe	  even	  primarily,	  
a	  battle	  between	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  religion	  to	  the	  state:	  a	  battle	  between	  a	  
“republican”	  form	  of	  Islam	  and	  a	  “traditionalist”	  form	  of	  Islam	  that	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  authoritarian	  
politics.	  	  Differences	  between	  what	  I	  am	  calling	  “republican”	  Islam	  and	  “traditionalist”	  Islam	  do	  not	  
necessarily	  translate	  into	  sharp	  differences	  regarding	  the	  content	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  an	  observant	  
Muslim	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  or	  even	  the	  degree	  of	  rigor	  in	  religious	  practice;	  rather,	  their	  disagreement	  
arises	  largely	  in	  domains	  such	  as	  the	  proper	  mode	  by	  which	  religious	  knowledge	  is	  to	  be	  acquired	  and	  
their	  affective	  dispositions	  to	  the	  tradition	  itself.	  	  For	  traditionalist	  Islam,	  then,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  one	  
to	  hold	  the	  correct	  beliefs,	  and	  practice	  outwardly	  Islamic	  rituals	  in	  the	  proper	  sense;	  one	  must	  also	  
acquire	  one’s	  knowledge	  of	  authoritative	  doctrine	  and	  practice	  from	  a	  teacher	  who	  is	  himself	  well-­‐
grounded	  in	  the	  “tradition”	  through	  an	  established	  chain	  of	  teachers,	  real	  or	  imagined,	  going	  all	  the	  way	  
back	  to	  the	  Prophet	  of	  Islam	  (ideally	  at	  least).	  	  Tradition	  is	  indispensable	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  religious	  
knowledge	  and	  virtues	  from	  this	  perspective	  because	  the	  mastery	  of	  religious	  values	  emerges	  through	  a	  
process	  of	  acculturation	  (tarbiya)	  which	  enables	  novices	  to	  embody	  those	  values.	  	  This	  process	  of	  
acculturation	  is	  distinct	  from,	  and	  transcends	  intellectual	  cognition	  (ʿilm)	  of	  religious	  truth.3	  	  	  While	  
religious	  truth	  may	  be	  a	  proper	  subject	  of	  instruction	  (taʿlīm),	  mere	  instruction,	  without	  reliable	  
teachers	  who	  properly	  embody	  Islamic	  teachings,	  cannot	  produce	  properly	  acculturated	  religious	  
subjects.4	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  what	  I	  am	  calling	  “traditionalist”	  Islam	  continues	  to	  place	  great	  emphasis	  on	  
Sufism,	  sometimes	  called	  Islamic	  mysticism,	  because	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  institutions	  and	  practices	  that	  
Sufism	  cultivates,	  including	  the	  hierarchical	  relationship	  between	  the	  teacher	  (al-­‐shaykh)	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	   Malika	  Zeghal,	  “Religious	  Education	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt:	  Contrasting	  the	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Reforms	  of	  Al-­‐
Azhar	  and	  the	  Zaytuna,”	  in	  Trajectories	  of	  Education	  in	  the	  Arab	  World:	  Legacies	  and	  Challenges	  115–116	  (Osama	  
Abi-­‐Mershed	  ed.,	  2010). 
	  
3	  	   Tarbiya	  is	  the	  verbal	  noun	  from	  the	  verb	  rabbā,	  which	  means	  “to	  rear,	  nurture,”	  while	  taʿlīm	  is	  the	  verbal	  
noun	  from	  the	  verb	  ʿallama,	  which	  means	  “to	  teach,	  instruct.”	  	  The	  object	  of	  what	  is	  taught	  is	  called	  ʿilm,	  which	  
means	  “science”	  or	  “knowledge.”	  Knowledge	  is	  simply	  a	  product	  of	  propositional	  reasoning,	  and	  does	  not,	  on	  its	  
own,	  lead	  to	  certain	  embodied	  virtues.	  	  	  
	  
4	  	   See,	  for	  example,	  Instruction	  of	  the	  Student:	  the	  Method	  of	  Learning,	  Burhān	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Zarnūjī,	  translated	  
by	  G.E.	  von	  Grunebaum	  &	  Theodora	  M.	  Abel	  (Starlach	  Press,	  2003,	  2nd	  revised	  edition),	  pp.	  13-­‐17.	  	  Hamza	  Yūsuf,	  an	  
American	  convert	  to	  Islam	  and	  a	  leading	  US	  traditionalist	  Muslim	  theologian,	  expresses	  support	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  
proper	  Islamic	  education	  is	  dependent	  upon	  immersion	  in	  tradition	  when	  he	  wrote	  in	  the	  forward	  to	  this	  
translation,	  “We	  are	  indeed	  spiritual	  and	  intellectual	  children,	  and	  until	  we	  mature	  through	  learning	  and	  mastering	  
our	  own	  tradition,	  we	  can	  not	  safely	  trust	  ourselves	  to	  delve	  into	  primary	  texts	  for	  other	  than	  blessings	  and	  moral	  
guidance.”	  Ibid.,	  p.	  ix.	  	  	  
	  3	  
	  
student	  (al-­‐murīd),	  are	  indispensable	  in	  the	  production	  of	  a	  properly	  embodied	  practice	  of	  Islam.	  	  Under	  
the	  traditionalist	  conception,	  then,	  individuals	  lack	  the	  independent	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  virtue	  and	  need	  
assistance	  from	  others	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  live	  virtuous	  lives,	  a	  position	  that	  generates	  sympathy	  
for	  authoritarian	  rule,	  at	  least	  if	  it	  is	  appropriately	  pious.	  
What	  I	  am	  calling	  “republican”	  Islam	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  traditionalist	  difference	  between	  
embodiment	  of	  religion	  and	  intellectual	  cognition	  of	  its	  truth,	  but	  it	  denies	  the	  necessity	  of	  tradition	  as	  a	  
pre-­‐condition	  for	  embodying	  Islamic	  religious	  values.	  	  It	  believes	  that	  any	  properly	  motivated	  Muslim	  
who	  has	  sufficient	  intellectual	  skills	  may	  study	  the	  basic	  sources	  of	  Islam	  independently	  and	  obtain	  an	  
adequate	  degree	  of	  religious	  knowledge	  and	  virtue.	  	  “Republican”	  Islam,	  however,	  is	  not	  constituted	  by	  
a	  particular	  stance	  toward	  the	  Islamic	  tradition;	  however,	  it	  is	  consistent	  both	  with	  a	  healthy	  respect	  for	  
the	  intellectual	  content	  of	  the	  tradition,	  and	  with	  complete	  indifference	  or	  even	  hostility	  to	  that	  
tradition.	  	  What	  unites	  “republican”	  Islam	  is	  simply	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  “tradition”	  is	  not	  necessary	  
for	  living	  as	  a	  good	  Muslim	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  The	  potential	  for	  each	  person	  independently	  to	  
acquire	  an	  adequate	  conception	  of	  Islamic	  virtue	  and	  manifest	  it	  without	  the	  need	  for	  authoritative	  
teachers	  recognizes	  each	  person	  as	  a	  potentially	  self-­‐governing	  virtuous	  actor,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  gives	  this	  
conception	  of	  Islam	  its	  republican	  disposition.	  	  	  
While	  it	  would	  be	  an	  error	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  positions	  articulated	  in	  this	  contemporary	  debate	  
in	  Egypt	  are	  simply	  a	  recapitulation	  of	  medieval	  debates	  on	  the	  relationship	  of	  religion	  to	  political	  
ordering,	  both	  lines	  of	  debate	  can	  plausibly	  lay	  claim	  to	  parts	  of	  the	  long	  tradition	  of	  Islamic	  political	  
thought.	  	  Given	  the	  depth	  of	  support	  among	  traditionalist	  theologians	  for	  the	  coup	  in	  Egypt,	  more	  
attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  these	  non-­‐republican,	  authoritarian	  forms	  of	  political	  Islam.	  	  This	  paper	  
attempts	  to	  address	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  by	  considering	  arguments	  in	  Sunni	  Islam	  that	  might	  cause	  
traditionalist	  theocrats	  to	  favor	  authoritarianism	  over	  a	  republican	  form	  of	  theocracy.	  	  	  Part	  I	  of	  the	  
paper	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  normative	  constitutional	  theory	  in	  Sunni	  thought.	  	  Part	  II	  will	  
introduce	  Sunni	  conceptions	  of	  non-­‐normative,	  emergency	  rule,	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  normative	  Sunni	  
legal	  order	  and	  how	  emergency	  rule	  provided	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  quasi-­‐Platonic	  philosophical	  
theory	  of	  religion	  and	  the	  state	  that	  helped	  justify	  a	  hierarchical,	  indeed,	  authoritarian	  political	  order.	  
Part	  III	  discusses	  Islamic	  modernism	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  restore	  normative	  constitutional	  rule	  against	  a	  
state	  of	  emergency.	  	  Part	  IV	  will	  then	  apply	  this	  framework	  to	  the	  current	  religious	  divides	  by	  focusing	  
on	  the	  positions	  taken	  by	  two-­‐well	  regarded	  representatives	  of	  each	  tradition	  toward	  the	  Egyptian	  
Revolution	  of	  2011	  and	  the	  military	  coup	  of	  2013,	  Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī,	  for	  the	  “republican”	  camp,	  and	  ʿAlī	  
Jumuʿa,	  for	  the	  authoritarian	  camp.5	  Part	  V	  will	  discuss	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Ṣukūk	  Law,	  a	  law	  passed	  
during	  the	  brief	  tenure	  of	  the	  deposed	  President	  Morsi,	  which	  authorized	  the	  state	  to	  issue	  bonds	  in	  
conformity	  with	  Islamic	  law,	  and	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  to	  involve	  the	  senior	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	   A	  full	  treatment	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  Islam	  camp	  would	  include	  a	  treatment	  of	  the	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  
Salafi	  movement,	  whose	  leader	  Yasir	  Burhami,	  also	  supported	  the	  coup.	  	  Space	  limitations,	  however,	  preclude	  
specific	  treatment	  of	  Salafi	  political	  thought.	  	  For	  an	  essay	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  of	  contemporary	  Salafi	  
political	  thought	  to	  democracy,	  and	  why	  they	  supported	  the	  coup,	  see	  Jonathan	  Brown,	  “The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  
Salafi	  al-­‐Nour	  Party	  in	  Egypt,”	  November	  14,	  2013,	  Jadaliyya,	  available	  at	  
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15113/the-­‐rise-­‐and-­‐fall-­‐of-­‐the-­‐salafi-­‐al-­‐nour-­‐party-­‐in-­‐e#_ftn4	  (last	  viewed,	  
March	  4,	  2015).	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theologians	  of	  the	  Azhar	  in	  the	  law	  making	  process.	  	  This	  incident,	  I	  suggest,	  brings	  into	  sharp	  relief	  the	  
different	  models	  of	  Islam	  and	  the	  state:	  one,	  advocated	  by	  the	  Muslim	  Brothers	  and	  its	  supporters,	  that	  
believes	  that	  a	  representative	  state	  is	  the	  best	  interpreter	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  and	  the	  other,	  represented	  by	  
scholars	  like	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  which	  believes	  that	  Islamic	  law	  is	  best	  articulated	  by	  a	  specialized	  body	  that	  
exists	  above	  and	  outside	  the	  state.	  	  The	  paper	  will	  then	  conclude.	  
1. Normative	  Sunnī	  Constitutional	  Theory	  
Normative	  Sunnī	  constitutional	  theory	  is	  comprised	  of	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  caliphate,	  including,	  the	  
rules	  governing	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  caliph,	  the	  powers	  he	  exercises	  and	  the	  manner	  by	  which	  those	  
powers	  may	  be	  exercised,	  and	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  establishment	  of	  lesser	  offices,	  their	  powers,	  and	  
how	  those	  powers	  may	  be	  exercised.	  	  In	  Sunnī	  theology,	  the	  caliph,	  although	  he	  is	  a	  successor	  to	  the	  
Prophet	  Muḥammad,	  lacks	  prophetic	  authority.	  	  Instead,	  he	  is	  charged	  with	  protecting	  the	  worldly	  
interests	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community.	  	  	  Alongside	  the	  secular	  duties	  of	  defending	  the	  frontiers,	  collecting	  
and	  distributing	  taxes,	  upholding	  justice,	  making	  appointments	  of	  lesser	  public	  officials,	  e.g.,	  regional	  
governors	  and	  judges,	  and	  construction	  of	  public	  works,	  the	  caliph	  was	  also	  responsible	  for	  protecting	  
religious	  orthodoxy	  against	  both	  non-­‐Muslim	  enemies	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  and	  heretical	  Muslims	  
whose	  heterodox	  belief	  undermine	  true	  religion.6	  	  
	   In	  Sunnī	  constitutional	  theory,	  appointment	  of	  a	  caliph	  is	  an	  obligation	  on	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  
Muslim	  community	  (farḍ	  kifāya),	  and	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  contract	  (ʿaqd)	  between	  the	  community	  and	  
the	  duly	  appointed	  candidate.	  	  The	  duty	  is	  discharged	  pursuant	  to	  a	  deliberative	  process	  involving	  a	  
group	  of	  electors,	  known	  as	  ahl	  al-­‐ḥall	  wa’l-­‐ʿaqd,	  “those	  who	  loosen	  and	  bind.”	  	  These	  individuals	  are	  
entrusted	  with	  selecting	  an	  appropriate	  candidate	  for	  the	  office	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  requirements	  
Islamic	  law	  imposed	  on	  the	  office	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  community’s	  particular	  circumstances	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  selection.	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  incumbent	  caliph	  was	  authorized	  to	  act	  as	  the	  sole	  elector	  and	  
designate	  his	  successor	  (walī	  al-­‐ʿahd)	  during	  the	  incumbent’s	  lifetime.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  once	  the	  electors	  
settled	  on	  a	  candidate	  for	  the	  office,	  or	  the	  incumbent	  caliph	  selected	  a	  successor,	  the	  electors,	  or	  the	  
incumbent	  caliph,	  as	  applicable,	  extended	  an	  offer	  to	  the	  selected	  candidate	  to	  accept	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  
office.	  Only	  upon	  the	  candidate’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  offer	  is	  the	  contract	  concluded,	  and	  the	  communal	  
duty	  to	  appoint	  a	  caliph	  discharged.7	  	  	  
In	  both	  scenarios,	  Islamic	  law	  understood	  the	  electors	  and	  the	  incumbent	  caliph	  to	  be	  acting	  in	  a	  
representative	  –	  not	  a	  personal	  –	  capacity	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Thus,	  they	  
were	  not	  permitted	  to	  select	  a	  candidate	  based	  on	  personal	  preferences;	  rather,	  they	  were	  entrusted	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  	   Mohammad	  Fadel,	  “Back	  to	  the	  Future:	  the	  Paradoxical	  Revival	  of	  Aspirations	  for	  an	  Islamic	  State,”	  14,1	  
Review	  of	  Constitutional	  Studies	  105,	  109-­‐13	  (2009)	  (giving	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Sunnī	  theory	  of	  legitimate	  
government).	  	  For	  a	  more	  thorough	  account	  of	  the	  normative	  Sunnī	  conception	  of	  the	  state,	  see	  Mohammad	  
Fadel,	  “Islamic	  Law	  Reform:	  Between	  Reinterpretation	  and	  Democracy	  –	  Neal	  Coulson	  Memorial	  Lecture	  School	  of	  
Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies,”	  18	  Yearbook	  of	  Islamic	  and	  Middle	  Eastern	  Law	  (forthcoming).	  
	  
7	  	   Al-­‐Māwardī,	  The	  Ordinances	  of	  Government:	  a	  Translation	  of	  Al-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Sulṭāniyya	  w’al-­‐Wilāyāt	  al-­‐
Dīniyya,	  translated	  by	  Wafaa	  H.	  Wahba	  (Reading,	  UK:	  Center	  for	  Muslim	  Contribution	  to	  Civilization;	  London	  :	  
Garnet	  Publishing	  LImited,	  1996),	  Chapter	  1.	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use	  their	  discretion	  to	  pick	  the	  most	  appropriate	  candidate	  in	  light	  of	  the	  requirements	  imposed	  by	  the	  
law	  and	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  community	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  election.	  	  The	  electors	  were	  not	  
permitted	  to	  change	  their	  minds	  and	  depose	  the	  incumbent	  caliph	  unless	  the	  caliph	  breached	  the	  
contract	  by	  which	  he	  became	  caliph.	  	  So	  too,	  the	  incumbent	  caliph	  was	  not	  permitted	  to	  dismiss	  a	  duly	  
appointed	  successor	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  legal	  cause.	  In	  each	  case,	  Muslim	  jurists	  reasoned	  that	  the	  
authority	  used	  by	  the	  electors	  to	  appoint	  the	  caliph,	  or	  by	  the	  caliph	  to	  designate	  a	  successor,	  was	  
limited	  to	  discharging	  the	  right	  of	  the	  community	  to	  see	  that	  the	  office	  of	  the	  caliph	  was	  duly	  filled.	  	  
Once	  that	  obligation	  was	  discharged,	  the	  electors,	  or	  the	  caliph,	  as	  applicable,	  were	  divested	  of	  any	  
authority	  they	  might	  have	  until	  such	  time	  as	  the	  law	  re-­‐authorized	  them,	  e.g.,	  if	  the	  caliph	  commits	  a	  
material	  breach	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  continue	  in	  office,	  or	  if	  the	  designated	  successor	  
becomes	  physically	  or	  legally	  incapable	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  office.8	  	  
The	  representative	  capacity	  of	  the	  electors	  and	  the	  caliph	  in	  the	  process	  by	  which	  caliphs	  are	  
selected	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  Sunnī	  understanding	  that	  the	  caliph	  –	  and	  by	  extension	  all	  public	  offices	  –	  
are	  representatives	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community,	  and	  that	  their	  authority	  is	  dependent	  upon	  contractual	  
delegation	  and	  not	  inherent	  personal	  authority,	  whether	  understood	  as	  coming	  from	  God	  or	  good	  
fortune.	  	  In	  normative	  Sunnī	  legal	  theory,	  then,	  all	  public	  officials	  exercised	  powers	  pursuant	  to	  a	  proper	  
delegation:	  the	  caliph	  is	  appointed	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  public,	  and	  he	  then	  delegates	  various	  
powers	  to	  lesser	  officials,	  with	  each	  official’s	  authority	  being	  limited	  to	  the	  terms	  set	  out	  in	  the	  relevant	  
act	  of	  delegation.	  	  The	  representative	  rather	  than	  personal	  character	  of	  the	  caliph’s	  authority,	  and	  the	  
authority	  of	  other	  public	  offices,	  is	  confirmed	  in	  various	  discussions	  on	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  public	  officials,	  
and	  whether	  they	  terminate	  upon	  the	  death	  or	  dismissal	  of	  the	  relevant	  appointing	  official.	  	  Jurists,	  for	  
example,	  carefully	  distinguished	  between	  public	  officials	  who	  were	  personal	  delegates	  of	  the	  caliph,	  
such	  as	  ministers,	  and	  public	  officials,	  such	  as	  regional	  governors	  and	  judge,	  who	  were	  delegates	  of	  the	  
public.	  	  The	  class	  of	  officials	  who	  are	  personal	  delegates	  of	  the	  caliph	  are	  automatically	  divested	  of	  their	  
offices	  upon	  the	  death	  or	  removal	  of	  the	  caliph	  who	  appointed	  them,	  while	  officials	  who	  were	  deemed	  
to	  be	  delegates	  of	  the	  public	  continued	  in	  office,	  even	  after	  the	  caliph	  who	  appointed	  them	  died	  or	  was	  
removed	  from	  office.9	  	  	  
The	  contract	  of	  the	  caliph,	  because	  of	  its	  representative	  character,	  imposed	  upon	  the	  caliph,	  and	  
other	  public	  officials,	  the	  duties	  of	  a	  fiduciary.	  	  The	  fiduciary	  nature	  of	  the	  powers	  that	  the	  caliph	  –	  and	  
by	  extension,	  other	  public	  officials	  –	  enjoys	  is	  manifested	  expressly	  in	  the	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  
caliph’s	  designated	  successor:	  walī	  al-­‐ʿahd,	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  covenant.10	  	  “The	  covenant”	  itself	  is	  that	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  110	  n.	  21.	  
	  
9	  	   See,	  for	  example,	  Abū	  al-­‐Ḥasan	  ʿAlī	  b.	  Muḥammad	  b.	  Ḥabīb	  al-­‐Māwardī,	  al-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Sulṭāniyya	  (Beirut:	  
Dār	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  n.d.),	  p.	  37	  (distinguishing	  between	  a	  governor	  who	  was	  appointed	  by	  the	  caliph,	  whose	  
appointment	  survives	  the	  appointing	  caliph’s	  death,	  and	  a	  governor	  appointed	  by	  the	  caliph’s	  prime	  minister,	  
whose	  appointment	  comes	  to	  an	  end	  with	  the	  death	  of	  the	  prime	  minister,	  because	  the	  caliph’s	  appointments	  are	  
in	  “right	  of	  the	  Muslims	  (niyāba	  ʿan	  al-­‐muslimīn)”	  while	  the	  appointments	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  are	  in	  “right	  of	  
himself	  (niyāba	  ʿan	  nafsihi).”	  
	  




the	  Muslim	  community	  and	  entails	  that	  the	  Muslim	  community	  entrusts	  the	  ruler	  and	  the	  public	  officials	  
he	  appoints	  to	  use	  the	  powers	  delegated	  to	  them	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  community	  and	  not	  their	  own	  
personal	  good.	  	  The	  fiduciary	  character	  of	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  public	  officials	  in	  turn	  creates	  a	  duty	  
of	  obedience	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  contractual	  basis	  of	  public	  office,	  
which	  creates	  a	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  between	  the	  ruler	  (and	  other	  public	  officials)	  and	  the	  
Muslim	  community,	  combined	  with	  the	  fiduciary	  powers	  of	  public	  officials	  over	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Muslim	  
community,	  provide	  two	  alternative,	  but	  mutually	  reinforcing,	  moral	  grounds	  that	  limit	  the	  power	  of	  
public	  officials	  while	  simultaneously	  justifying	  the	  duty	  of	  obedience	  to	  the	  public	  order	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  public.11	  	  	  
2. Non-­‐Ideal	  Sunni	  Constitutional	  Theory	  
In	  an	  ideally	  constituted	  Sunnī	  state,	  the	  caliph	  sits	  atop	  the	  public	  order,	  having	  been	  duly	  selected	  by	  
electors,	  acting	  in	  good	  faith	  for	  the	  public	  good,	  or	  after	  having	  been	  appointed	  by	  the	  previous	  caliph	  
who,	  after	  diligently	  considering	  all	  possible	  candidates,	  selected	  his	  successor	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
law	  and	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  community.	  	  So	  too,	  lesser	  officials	  –	  governors,	  judges,	  market	  
inspectors,	  generals,	  tax	  collectors,	  etc.	  –	  are	  also	  appointed,	  based	  on	  the	  legal	  requirements	  
established	  for	  their	  respective	  offices,	  which	  include	  knowledge	  of	  applicable	  substantive	  law	  and	  
possession	  of	  an	  adequate	  degree	  of	  personal	  integrity.	  	  All	  public	  officials,	  from	  the	  caliph	  to	  the	  
lowliest	  tax	  collector,	  moreover,	  know	  the	  substantive	  law	  that	  applies	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  powers,	  
and	  dutifully	  follow	  its	  requirements;	  moreover,	  they	  are	  careful	  to	  refrain	  from	  exceeding	  the	  territorial	  
and	  substantive	  limitations	  of	  their	  jurisdiction,	  which	  are	  spelled	  out	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  appointment.	  
	   This	  ideal	  description	  of	  the	  Sunnī	  constitutional	  order	  suggests	  a	  conception	  of	  public	  order	  
that	  is	  wholly	  indifferent	  to	  questions	  of	  power,	  and	  in	  certain	  respects,	  one	  could	  say,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  
that	  Sunnī	  theologians	  and	  jurists	  aspired	  to	  establish	  a	  public	  order	  that	  was	  justified	  entirely	  by	  
reference	  to	  legal	  norms.	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  this	  tendency	  of	  Sunnī	  constitutional	  thought	  that	  Orientalist	  
historians	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  they	  referred,	  often	  derisively,	  to	  Sunnī	  constitutional	  law	  as	  expressing	  a	  
utopian	  ideal	  that	  was	  disconnected	  to	  the	  actual	  circumstances	  of	  historical	  Muslim	  states.	  	  
It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake,	  however,	  to	  think	  that	  ideal	  Sunnī	  theory	  was	  completely	  indifferent	  to	  
questions	  of	  power.	  	  Two	  of	  the	  earliest	  comprehensive	  legal	  treatments	  of	  the	  caliphate	  both	  include	  
the	  requirement	  that	  the	  successful	  candidate	  for	  the	  caliphate	  possess	  martial	  qualities	  that	  gives	  him	  
effective	  power,	  not	  only	  to	  deter	  external	  enemies,	  but	  also	  to	  uphold	  and	  defend	  the	  public	  order.12	  
Unlike	  the	  other	  legal	  requirements	  such	  as	  learning,	  integrity	  and	  physical	  fitness,	  the	  requirement	  of	  
effective	  power	  –	  with	  the	  political	  and	  martial	  qualities	  implicit	  in	  that	  requirement	  –	  was	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  	   Fadel,	  p.	  111	  n.	  22.	  
	  
12	  	   Al-­‐Māwardī,	  p.	  6	  (courage	  and	  boldness	  for	  the	  confrontation	  of	  external	  and	  internal	  threats)	  and	  Abū	  
Yaʿlā	  Muḥammad	  b.	  al-­‐Ḥusayn	  al-­‐Farrāʾ,	  al-­‐Aḥkām	  al-­‐Sulṭāniyya	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  1983),	  p.	  20	  




something	  that	  could	  be	  presently	  ascertained	  in	  any	  particular	  candidate.	  At	  best,	  it	  could	  be	  hoped	  
that	  the	  nominee	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  enjoy	  the	  functional	  attributes	  that	  were	  demanded	  of	  the	  caliph.	  	  	  
	   The	  ability	  to	  wield	  effective	  power	  introduced	  an	  element	  of	  political	  realism	  into	  Sunnī	  
constitutional	  thought	  that	  was	  otherwise	  overwhelmingly	  legalistic	  in	  its	  outlook	  on	  public	  law.	  	  As	  a	  
practical	  matter,	  this	  manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  jurisdiction	  by	  acquisition	  (imārat	  al-­‐istīlāʾ),	  
rather	  than	  delegation.13	  	  Under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  ideal	  Sunnī	  constitution,	  the	  caliph	  is	  responsible	  for	  
the	  public	  order	  in	  its	  entirety,	  appointing	  and	  dismissing	  public	  officials,	  including	  regional	  governors,	  in	  
the	  good	  faith	  exercise	  of	  his	  discretion.	  	  What	  happens,	  however,	  if	  the	  caliph	  lacks	  effective	  power	  to	  
enforce	  his	  decisions,	  or	  if	  a	  local	  politician,	  who	  himself	  might	  be	  a	  military	  commander	  or	  in	  alliance	  
with	  a	  local	  military	  commander,	  seizes	  the	  apparatus	  of	  the	  government	  without	  the	  caliph’s	  prior	  
consent?	  	  In	  such	  a	  circumstance,	  the	  local	  politician	  is	  acting	  without	  right	  and	  therefore	  is	  a	  rebel	  
insofar	  as	  he	  is	  acting	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  public	  order	  represented	  by	  the	  caliph.	  	  If,	  however,	  the	  usurper	  
is	  prepared	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  public	  order,	  and	  to	  uphold	  it,	  including,	  by	  recognizing	  
the	  caliph,	  Muslim	  jurists	  were	  prepared	  to	  legitimate	  the	  rebel’s	  position	  through	  an	  ex	  post	  process	  
known	  as	  ratification	  of	  jurisdiction	  (taṣḥīḥ	  al-­‐wilāya).	  	  This	  was	  justified	  on	  the	  functional	  grounds	  of	  
the	  public	  welfare:	  insofar	  as	  the	  rebel	  was	  prepared	  to	  lay	  down	  his	  arms	  and	  uphold	  the	  public	  order,	  
the	  public	  good	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  re-­‐establishing	  peace	  and	  stability	  rather	  than	  engage	  in	  
further	  conflict	  that	  would	  undermine	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  local	  community	  affected.14	  
	   But	  the	  recognition	  of	  usurpers	  on	  functional	  grounds	  was	  not	  the	  most	  crucial	  channel	  through	  
which	  the	  spectre	  of	  violence	  entered	  into	  the	  constitutional	  order.	  	  Although	  there	  was	  an	  ideal	  that	  
the	  caliph	  should	  be	  appointed	  through	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  community	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  electors’	  
deliberations,	  pre-­‐modern	  jurists	  never	  provided	  a	  conclusive	  procedural	  means	  for	  determining	  how	  
many	  electors	  needed	  to	  support	  a	  candidate	  in	  order	  for	  that	  candidate	  to	  be	  selected	  as	  caliph.	  	  Al-­‐
Māwardī,	  for	  example,	  reported	  various	  positions	  on	  the	  minimum	  amount	  of	  support	  a	  successful	  
caliph	  required,	  with	  some	  theologians	  and	  jurists	  holding	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  suitable	  candidate	  by	  
even	  one	  elector	  was	  sufficient	  for	  the	  contract	  to	  be	  constituted.	  	  This	  position	  was	  allegedly	  based	  on	  
historical	  precedents	  from	  the	  early	  Muslim	  community	  when	  it	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  city-­‐state	  in	  
western	  Arabia,	  but	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  role	  and	  number	  of	  electors	  needed	  to	  select	  a	  caliph	  also	  
served	  an	  important	  functional	  purpose:	  to	  classify	  combatants	  as	  either	  supporters	  of	  the	  legitimate	  
order,	  or	  rebels	  that	  could	  be	  legitimately	  targeted	  and	  killed	  so	  long	  as	  they	  defy	  the	  legitimate	  order.	  	  	  
The	  division	  between	  supporters	  of	  the	  legitimate	  order	  and	  rebels	  was	  derivative	  of	  the	  Sunnī	  
notion	  that	  formation	  of	  the	  public	  order	  was	  itself	  obligatory,	  and	  once	  that	  obligation	  was	  discharged,	  
all	  Muslims	  were	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  submit	  to	  that	  authority.	  	  It	  thus	  followed	  that	  those	  who	  
refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  putative	  caliph	  by,	  for	  example,	  recognizing	  another	  ruler	  in	  whose	  name	  taxes	  
were	  collected,	  judges	  were	  appointed,	  and	  judicial	  verdicts	  enforced,	  were	  legally	  rebels	  –	  at	  least	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  	   Al-­‐Māwardī,	  pp.	  39-­‐40.	  
	  




the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  recognized	  the	  putative	  caliph	  –	  and	  could	  be	  legitimately	  fought.15	  	  Al-­‐
Māwārdī’s	  contemporary,	  the	  Ḥanbalī	  jurist	  al-­‐Farrāʾ,	  recognized	  that	  a	  consent-­‐based	  theory	  of	  the	  
state,	  if	  taken	  seriously,	  would	  require	  that	  the	  successful	  candidate	  garner	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  vast	  
majority	  (al-­‐jumhūr)	  of	  the	  electors.16	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  candidate,	  the	  successful	  candidate	  will	  
inevitably	  be	  the	  one	  who	  conquers	  and	  subdues	  (qahr)	  his	  rivals,	  with	  each	  one	  of	  them,	  until	  the	  
moment	  he	  is	  defeated	  (and	  thus	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  pretender),	  having	  a	  colorable	  claim	  to	  be	  caliph.17	  	  For	  
Farrāʾ,	  then,	  consent,	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  appointing	  the	  caliph,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  an	  aspirational	  ideal,	  was,	  as	  a	  
practical	  matter,	  utopian.	  	  The	  real	  basis	  of	  the	  ruler’s	  authority	  was	  his	  effective	  ability	  to	  subdue	  his	  
rivals.	  	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  a	  leading	  jurist	  in	  the	  generation	  following	  Māwardī	  and	  Farrāʾ,	  proposed	  to	  resolve	  
the	  contradiction	  between	  consent	  and	  power	  by	  reaffirming	  Māwardī’s	  contention	  that	  the	  consent	  of	  
the	  electors	  was	  crucial,	  but	  incorporating	  Farrāʾ’s	  critique	  of	  the	  consent-­‐based	  theory	  by	  specifying	  
that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  consent	  of	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  number	  of	  electors	  that	  made	  the	  appointment	  
effective,	  but	  rather	  the	  candidate’s	  success	  in	  receiving	  the	  support	  of	  those	  electors,	  e.g.,	  military	  
leaders,	  who	  could	  provide	  the	  candidate	  with	  the	  effective	  power	  (shawka)	  to	  discharge	  the	  functions	  
of	  the	  caliph.18	  	  	  
	   The	  solution	  proposed	  by	  Ghazali	  has	  been	  described	  as	  resulting	  in	  an	  effective	  separation	  of	  
the	  secular,	  worldly	  aspects	  of	  governance	  –	  which	  would	  become	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  
effective	  coercive	  power,	  i.e.	  the	  military	  –	  and	  the	  religious	  aspects	  of	  governance,	  e.g.,	  maintenance	  of	  
courts,	  supervision	  of	  public	  rituals,	  etc.,	  which	  would	  remain	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  caliph,	  and	  the	  
religious	  officials	  he	  appointed	  to	  fill	  largely	  religious	  posts.19	  	  In	  this	  scheme,	  the	  religious	  class	  was	  to	  
act	  as	  the	  advisors	  to	  the	  holders	  of	  power	  by	  teaching	  them	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice	  through	  
instruction	  in	  Islamic	  law.	  	  The	  military	  class,	  if	  only	  out	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  would	  uphold	  the	  requirements	  
of	  the	  law	  because	  it	  understood	  that	  the	  economic	  foundations	  of	  their	  power	  depended	  upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  74.	  
	  
16	  	   Al-­‐Farrāʾ,	  p.	  23.	  	  	  
	  
17	  	   Ibid.	  (“wa	  ruwiya	  ʿan	  [Aḥmad	  b.	  Ḥanbal]	  mā	  dalla	  ʿalā	  annahā	  tathbut	  bi’l-­‐qahr	  wa’l-­‐ghalaba	  wa	  lā	  
taftaqir	  ilā	  ʿaqd	  (The	  view	  that	  the	  Caliphate	  can	  be	  formed	  through	  conquest	  and	  defeat	  [of	  the	  other	  
candidates],	  without	  a	  need	  for	  a	  contract,	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  [Aḥmad	  b.	  Ḥanbal).”).	  
	  
18	  	   Richard	  Joseph	  McCarthy,	  Freedom	  and	  Fulfillment:	  an	  Annotated	  Translation	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  al-­‐Munqidh	  
min	  al-­‐Ḍalāl	  and	  other	  Relevant	  Works	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  (Boston:	  Twayne	  Publishers,	  1980),	  p.	  277.	  	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  also	  
asserted	  that	  the	  means	  by	  which	  social	  choice	  settles	  on	  a	  single	  candidate	  is	  never,	  and	  can	  never	  be,	  the	  
product	  solely	  of	  human	  choice.	  	  Rather,	  God’s	  choice	  manifests	  itself	  through	  the	  dynamics	  of	  social	  power	  that	  
settles	  on	  the	  successful	  candidate.	  	  Ibid.	  
	  





maintaining	  a	  basic	  system	  of	  justice,	  a	  theory	  popularly	  known	  as	  “the	  circle	  of	  justice,”	  and	  
popularized	  through	  numerous	  hortatory	  works	  written	  by	  the	  scholarly	  class	  to	  the	  rulers	  of	  their	  day.20	  	  	  
	   Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  however,	  did	  more	  than	  offer	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  normative	  elements	  of	  the	  
caliphate	  with	  its	  realistic	  elements;	  he	  also	  offered	  a	  philosophical	  account	  of	  politics	  that	  justified	  a	  
dualistic	  polity,	  one	  that	  separated	  its	  symbolic/normative	  order	  from	  its	  coercive	  order,	  and	  arranged	  
the	  various	  classes	  of	  society	  hierarchically.	  	  Accordingly,	  he	  posited	  four	  different	  kinds	  of	  politics:	  
prophetic;	  princely;	  rational;	  and,	  affective.21	  	  This	  taxonomy	  of	  the	  modes	  of	  political	  life	  was	  itself	  
dependent	  upon	  other	  conceptions,	  such	  as	  the	  social	  division	  between	  the	  elite	  (al-­‐khāṣṣa)	  and	  the	  
commoners	  (al-­‐ʿāmma),	  and	  a	  radical	  disjuncture	  between	  the	  rational	  capacities	  of	  each	  group.	  	  
Prophetic	  politics	  was	  the	  highest	  mode	  of	  politics	  according	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  because	  it,	  uniquely	  among	  
the	  four	  modes	  of	  politics,	  exercised	  universal	  jurisdiction,	  governing	  the	  political	  and	  the	  moral,	  and	  the	  
elite	  and	  the	  commoners.	  	  Princely	  politics	  was	  similar	  to	  prophetic	  politics	  insofar	  as	  it	  exercised	  
universal	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  elite	  and	  the	  commoners,	  but	  it	  was	  ultimately	  inferior	  to	  it	  on	  Ghazali’s	  
account	  because	  it	  had	  jurisdiction	  only	  over	  the	  outward	  aspects	  (ẓāhir)	  of	  people’s	  lives,	  not	  their	  
inner	  moral	  life	  (bāṭin).	  Unlike	  prophetic	  politics,	  which	  unified	  power	  with	  rationality	  and	  morality,	  
princely	  politics	  enjoys	  only	  the	  outward	  power	  of	  coercion,	  without	  any	  authority	  over	  the	  moral	  lives	  
of	  either	  the	  elite	  or	  the	  commoners.	  	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  prophetic	  politics,	  religious	  scholars,	  saints	  and	  philosophers	  are	  entrusted	  
with	  the	  government	  of	  the	  moral	  life	  of	  the	  elite,	  while	  preachers	  and	  jurists	  were	  entrusted	  with	  the	  
government	  of	  the	  moral	  life	  of	  commoners.	  	  The	  moral	  government	  of	  the	  elite	  is	  based	  on	  rational	  
argument	  and	  demonstration,	  while	  that	  of	  commoners,	  because	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  understanding	  
rational	  argumentation,	  is	  vested	  in	  preachers	  who	  use	  affective	  rhetoric,	  rooted	  in	  imagination,	  to	  
motivate	  the	  masses	  to	  virtue.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  impossibility	  in	  Islamic	  dogma	  of	  prophetic	  politics	  
following	  the	  death	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muḥammad,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Ghazālī	  concludes	  that	  the	  
noblest	  kind	  of	  post-­‐prophetic	  politics	  is	  that	  pursued	  by	  saints,	  philosophers	  and	  religious	  scholars	  who,	  
unlike	  other	  classes	  of	  society,	  pursue	  the	  good	  solely	  for	  its	  own	  sake.22	  	  The	  ruling	  class,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  although	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  understanding	  rational	  demonstration,	  are	  in	  fact	  moved	  by	  honor	  –	  
the	  love	  of	  praise	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  blame	  –	  and	  not	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  good	  for	  itself.	  What	  this	  means,	  
however,	  is	  that	  they	  can	  practically	  live	  good	  lives	  if	  their	  conceptions	  of	  honor	  and	  dishonor	  are	  
truthful,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  case	  when	  their	  conceptions	  of	  honor	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  
religious-­‐philosophical	  elite.23	  	  The	  masses,	  however,	  are	  moved	  only	  by	  the	  desire	  for	  pleasure	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  	   For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  circle	  of	  justice,	  see	  Wael	  Hallaq,	  Shariʿa:	  Theory,	  Practice	  and	  Transformation	  
(New	  York:	  Cambridge,	  2009),	  pp.	  199-­‐200.	  	  
	  
21	  	   Abū	  Ḥāmid	  Muḥammad	  b.	  Muḥammad	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Mīzān	  al-­‐ʿAmal,	  ed.	  Sulaymān	  Dunyā	  (Cairo:	  Dār	  al-­‐
Maʿārif,	  1964),	  p.	  329.	  
	  
22	  	   Ibid.,	  pp.	  287-­‐88.	  
	  




fear	  of	  pain,	  and	  accordingly,	  they	  must	  be	  controlled	  by	  law,	  which	  is	  primarily	  a	  means	  for	  restraining	  
their	  passion	  (shahwa).24	  
	   Ghazālī’s	  taxonomy	  of	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  politics	  in	  turn	  derived	  from	  his	  tripartite	  conception	  
of	  the	  soul’s	  powers,	  his	  conception	  of	  justice	  as	  the	  proper	  ordering	  of	  these	  powers,	  and	  the	  justice	  of	  
the	  polity	  being	  a	  macrocosm	  of	  the	  microcosm	  of	  justice	  in	  an	  individual.	  	  In	  Ghazali’s	  psychology,	  the	  
soul	  has	  three	  different	  powers,	  the	  intellectual	  (al-­‐tafakkur),	  the	  spirited	  (al-­‐ghaḍab),	  and	  the	  animal	  
(al-­‐shahwa).25	  Justice	  is	  not	  an	  independent	  virtue,	  but	  is	  rather	  a	  condition	  (ḥāl)	  that	  is	  achieved	  when	  
the	  three	  parts	  of	  the	  soul	  are	  ordered	  appropriately	  according	  to	  a	  natural	  hierarchy	  with	  the	  
intellectual	  at	  the	  apex,	  the	  spirited	  in	  the	  middle,	  and	  the	  animal	  at	  the	  bottom.26	  A	  person	  is	  just,	  then,	  
when	  his	  rational	  power	  is	  in	  control	  of	  his	  spirited	  and	  animal	  powers.27	  	  	  
Ghazālī	  applied	  this	  tripartite	  conception	  of	  the	  soul’s	  powers	  to	  understand	  the	  political	  life	  of	  
the	  polis	  (al-­‐madīna),	  which	  is	  also	  made	  up	  of	  three	  different	  classes:	  classes	  that	  are	  served	  by	  others,	  
classes	  that	  serve	  and	  are	  served,	  and	  classes	  that	  only	  serve	  others.	  	  Justice,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  polis,	  as	  
it	  is	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  individual,	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  proper	  ordering:	  it	  exists	  when	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  
various	  social	  classes	  is	  maintained	  according	  to	  their	  natural	  hierarchical	  order.	  	  	  
“Justice	  in	  politics,	  as	  we	  have	  mentioned	  in	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  soul,	  
is	  attained	  when	  the	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  city	  are	  arranged	  in	  the	  fashion	  that	  
imitates	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  soul	  such	  that	  the	  city	  becomes,	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  harmony,	  
the	  relationship	  of	  its	  constituent	  parts,	  and	  the	  cooperation	  of	  its	  various	  elements,	  
in	  accordance	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  living	  together,	  like	  a	  single	  body.	  	  Each	  thing,	  
therefore,	  must	  be	  placed	  where	  it	  belongs.	  Its	  residents	  are	  divided	  [into	  three	  
classes]:	  the	  first,	  which	  is	  served,	  but	  does	  not	  serve	  [others];	  the	  second,	  which	  
serves	  and	  is	  not	  served	  [by	  others];	  and,	  the	  third,	  a	  group	  which	  serves	  [others]	  in	  
certain	  respects,	  and	  is	  served	  [by	  others]	  in	  other	  respects.”28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  	   Ibid.	  
	  
25	  	   Ibid.,	  pp.	  232-­‐33.	  
	  
26	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  272	  (wa	  ammā	  al-­‐ʿadl	  fa-­‐huwa	  ḥāla	  li’l-­‐quwā	  al-­‐thalāth	  fī’-­‐ntiẓāmihā	  ʿalā	  al-­‐tanāsub	  bi-­‐ḥasab	  al-­‐
tartīb	  al-­‐wājib	  fī’l-­‐istiʿlāʾ	  wa’l-­‐inqiyād).	  
	  
27	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  234	  (wa	  mahmā	  aṣlaḥat	  al-­‐quwā	  al-­‐thalāth	  wa	  ḍubiṭat	  ʿalā	  al-­‐wajh	  alladhī	  yanbaghī	  wa	  ilā	  al-­‐
ḥadd	  alladhī	  yanbaghī	  wa	  juʿilat	  al-­‐quwwatān	  munqādatayni	  li’l-­‐thālitha	  allatī	  hiya	  al-­‐fikriyya	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  fa-­‐qad	  
ḥaṣalat	  al-­‐ʿadāla).	  
	  
28	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  273	  (wa’l-­‐ʿadl	  fī’l-­‐siyāsa	  an	  turattaba	  ajzāʾ	  al-­‐madīna	  al-­‐tartīb	  al-­‐mushākil	  li-­‐tartīb	  ajzāʾ	  al-­‐nafs	  
ḥattā	  takūna	  al-­‐madīna	  fī’-­‐ʾtilāfihā	  wa	  tanāsubi	  ajzāʾihā	  wa	  taʿāwun	  arkānihā	  ʿalā	  al-­‐gharaḍ	  al-­‐maṭlūb	  min	  al-­‐
ijtimāʿ	  ka’l-­‐shakhṣ	  al-­‐wāḥid	  fa-­‐yūḍaʿ	  kull	  shayʾ	  fī	  mawḍiʿihi	  wa	  yanqasim	  sukkānuhu	  ilā	  makhdūm	  lā	  yakhdim	  wa	  ilā	  




Justice	  in	  the	  city	  becomes	  manifest,	  therefore,	  when	  the	  ruler	  is	  wise	  and	  overpowering	  
(baṣīran	  qāhiran),	  the	  soldiery	  is	  mighty	  and	  obeyed	  (dhī	  quwwa	  wa	  ṭāʿa),	  and	  the	  masses	  are	  weak	  and	  
submissive	  (ḍuʿafāʾ	  salsā	  al-­‐inqiyād).29	  	  	  
The	  analogy	  of	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  city	  to	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  soul	  is	  not	  perfect,	  however,	  as	  Ghazālī	  
depicts	  the	  political	  class	  –	  the	  rulers	  (salāṭīn)	  and	  well-­‐regarded	  men	  of	  society	  –	  as	  having	  only	  juvenile	  
command	  of	  their	  reason	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐qāṣir),	  being	  regarded	  as	  rational	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plainly	  
irrational	  masses.	  	  The	  true	  possessors	  of	  perfected	  reason	  (kamāl	  al-­‐ʿaql)	  are	  the	  saints,	  scholars	  and	  
philosophers	  (awliyāʾ	  wa	  ḥukamāʾ	  wa	  muḥaqqiqī	  al-­‐ʿuqalāʾ).	  	  The	  political	  hierarchy	  reflects	  each	  class’s	  
relative	  perfection	  of	  its	  reason:	  the	  masses	  occupy	  the	  lowest	  rung	  of	  society	  because	  they	  are	  
motivated	  solely	  by	  their	  animal	  powers	  (al-­‐shahwa)	  and	  their	  desire	  for	  pleasure	  and	  their	  revulsion	  at	  
pain.	  	  Worldly	  rulers,	  and	  the	  other	  well-­‐regarded	  men	  of	  society,	  are	  motivated	  by	  honor,	  the	  love	  of	  
praise	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  blame	  from	  their	  peers.	  It	  is	  only	  the	  third	  group	  –	  the	  saints,	  the	  scholars	  and	  the	  
philosophers	  –	  who	  desire	  the	  good	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  good,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  perfected	  
reason.30	  	  As	  such,	  Ghazālī	  seems	  to	  argue,	  justice	  requires	  that	  they	  be	  the	  legislators	  for	  society,	  and	  
indeed,	  that	  is	  the	  role	  he	  prescribes	  for	  them:	  to	  provide	  rulers	  with	  the	  precepts	  necessary	  to	  establish	  
a	  just	  order.31	  	  Accordingly,	  he	  urges	  rulers	  to	  love	  scholars	  and	  heed	  their	  advice,	  making	  this	  the	  
second	  of	  his	  ten	  foundational	  principles	  of	  justice.32	  	  Given	  Ghazālī’s	  essentially	  hierarchical	  conception	  
of	  justice,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  he	  states	  that	  the	  ruler	  is	  chosen	  by	  God,	  and	  for	  this	  reason,	  the	  
people	  are	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  love	  him,	  obey	  him	  and	  not	  resist	  him.33	  	  The	  ruler’s	  moral	  obligation	  
is	  to	  show	  gratitude	  to	  God	  by	  discharging	  his	  duties	  as	  ruler	  diligently,	  humbly	  and	  sincerely.34	  Ghazālī’s	  
political	  thought,	  instead	  of	  conceiving	  the	  ideal	  ruler	  as	  the	  ideal	  agent,	  conceives	  of	  him	  as	  the	  ideal	  
autocrat:	  rational,	  pious	  and	  strong.	  
Ghazali	  is	  often	  recognized	  as	  the	  theoretical	  architect	  of	  the	  sultanate	  as	  the	  distinctive	  Islamic	  
institution	  of	  governance	  dominating	  the	  late	  Islamic	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  Early	  Modernity.	  Although	  the	  
sultanate	  was	  never	  recognized	  by	  the	  jurists	  as	  a	  distinct	  legal	  institution	  (all	  holders	  of	  public	  office	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30	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	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31	  	   Nabih	  Amin	  Faris,	  The	  Book	  of	  Knowledge,	  being	  a	  translation	  with	  notes	  of	  the	  Kitāb	  al-­‐ʿIlm	  of	  al-­‐
Ghazzālī’s	  Iḥyāʾ	  ʿUlūm	  al-­‐Dīn	  (Lahore:	  Sh.	  Muhammad	  Ashraf,	  	  P.	  33	  (“[The	  jurist]	  become	  the	  teacher	  of	  the	  
magistrates	  and	  their	  guide	  in	  government	  and	  control,	  that	  through	  their	  righteousness	  the	  affairs	  of	  men	  in	  this	  
world	  may	  be	  set	  in	  order.”).	  	  
	  
32	  	   Abū	  	  Hāmid	  Muḥammad	  b.	  Muḥammad	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  al-­‐Tibr	  al-­‐Masbūk	  fī	  Naṣāʾiḥ	  al-­‐Mulūk,	  edited	  by	  
Aḥmad	  Shams	  al-­‐Dīn	  (Beirut:	  Dar	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  1988),	  p.	  18.	  
	  
33	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  43	  (fa-­‐yanbaghī	  an	  yuʿlama	  anna	  man	  aʿṭāhu	  allāhu	  darajat	  al-­‐mulūk	  wa	  jaʿalahu	  ẓillahu	  fī’l-­‐arḍ	  
fa-­‐innahu	  yajib	  ʿalā	  al-­‐khalq	  maḥabbatuhu	  wa	  yalzamuhum	  mutābaʿatuhu	  wa	  ṭāʿatuhu	  wa	  lā	  yajūz	  lahum	  
maʿṣiyatuhu	  wa	  munāzaʿatuhu).	  
	  




from	  the	  earliest	  periods	  of	  Islamic	  law	  were	  designated	  with	  the	  title	  sulṭān),35	  jurists	  increasingly	  
recognized	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  rule	  through	  the	  fact	  of	  acquisition.	  	  Post-­‐Ghazālī	  Mamluk-­‐era	  Shāfiʿī	  jurists,	  
such	  as	  the	  well-­‐known	  and	  much	  maligned	  Badr	  al-­‐Dīn	  Ibn	  Jamāʿa,	  openly	  stated	  that	  conquest	  was	  a	  
means	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  government,	  and	  conquest	  came	  to	  be	  a	  third	  method	  for	  assumption	  of	  
the	  caliphate	  in	  authoritative	  Shāfiʿī	  manuals	  of	  positive	  law.36	  	  While	  statements	  such	  of	  modern	  
commentators	  such	  as	  H.A.R.	  Gibb	  and	  Noel	  Coulson	  that	  these	  concessions	  to	  de	  facto	  power	  
amounted	  to	  an	  abandonment	  of	  the	  legal	  norms	  of	  the	  shariʿa	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  “secular	  absolutism”37	  can	  
be	  dismissed	  as	  hyperbolic,	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  Sunnī	  jurists	  by	  the	  14th	  century	  had	  acquiesced	  to	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  ascension	  to	  rule	  through	  the	  force	  of	  arms,	  and	  instead	  of	  contesting	  the	  means	  by	  
which	  officials	  came	  to	  hold	  power,	  they	  invested	  their	  legitimating	  resources	  into	  influencing	  how	  de	  
facto	  power	  holders	  exercised	  their	  power.	  	  The	  waning	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  contractual	  legitimacy	  of	  rulers	  
was	  further	  accelerated	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  quasi-­‐Platonic	  philosophical	  conception	  of	  the	  just	  polity	  such	  
as	  those	  articulated	  by	  Ghazālī.	  	  The	  contractual	  tradition	  of	  legitimacy,	  however,	  would	  be	  resurrected	  
in	  the	  19th	  century,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  Muslim	  modernism.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  this	  topic.	  
3. Islamic	  Modernism,	  anti-­‐Despotism,	  and	  the	  Ideal	  of	  Popular	  Participation	  in	  Government	  
This	  division	  of	  labor,	  pursuant	  to	  which	  soldiers	  provided	  effective	  power,	  and	  the	  religious	  class	  
provided	  legitimacy,	  sustained	  politics	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  into	  early	  
modernity.	  	  And	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  which	  successfully	  reunited	  the	  Arab	  Middle	  East	  
(with	  the	  exception	  of	  Morocco	  and	  parts	  of	  ʿIraq),	  a	  political	  equilibrium	  was	  reached	  between,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  a	  powerful	  executive	  that	  could	  underwrite	  the	  security	  and	  justice	  of	  the	  territories	  under	  its	  
control,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  religious	  elite,	  which	  provided	  the	  Empire	  with	  effective	  religious	  
legitimacy	  by	  staffing	  the	  Empire’s	  courts	  and	  civilian	  bureaucracy.	  	  	  The	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  medieval	  Islamic	  political	  theorists	  such	  as	  al-­‐Ghazali,	  could	  very	  well	  have	  been	  viewed	  
as	  approximating	  late	  medieval	  Islamic	  political	  ideals:	  effective	  secular	  power	  was	  joined	  with	  religion	  
to	  produce	  a	  stable	  and	  powerful	  polity	  that	  in	  important	  ways	  lent	  effective	  institutional	  support	  to	  
Islamic	  religious	  and	  social	  ideals	  as	  well	  as	  implementing	  a	  system	  of	  public	  justice	  that	  was	  largely	  
derived	  from	  the	  work	  of	  the	  religious	  class.	  	  Although	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  supplemented	  Islamic	  law	  
with	  its	  own	  law	  –	  known	  as	  the	  qānūn	  –	  it	  did	  not	  claim	  that	  its	  dynastic	  law	  was	  superior	  to	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  	   Mohammad	  Fadel,	  “Public	  Authority	  (Sulṭān)	  in	  Islamic	  Law,”	  in	  The	  Oxford	  International	  Encyclopedia	  of	  




36	  	   See	  Hans	  Klofer,	  “Handbuch	  des	  islamischen	  Staats	  und	  Verwaltungsrechtes	  von	  Badr	  al-­‐Dīn	  ibn	  Ğamāʻa,”	  
6	  Islamica	  349-­‐414	  (1934)	  and	  7	  Islamica	  1-­‐64	  (1935);	  5	  Mughnī	  al-­‐Muḥtāj,	  Shams	  al-­‐Dīn	  Muḥammad	  b.	  Aḥmad	  al-­‐
Khaṭīb	  al-­‐Shirbīnī	  (Beirut:	  Dār	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐ʿIlmiyya,	  1st	  edition,	  1994),	  edited	  by	  ʿAlī	  Muḥammad	  Muʿawwaḍ	  and	  ʿĀdil	  
Aḥmad	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Mawjūd,	  p.	  423.	  	  
	  
37	  	   H.A.R.	  Gibb,	  “Constitutional	  Organization,”	  in	  Law	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  edited	  by	  M.	  Khadduri	  and	  H.	  
Liebesny	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  Middle	  East	  Institute,	  1955),	  p.	  23	  and	  Noel	  Coulson,	  “The	  State	  and	  the	  Individual	  
in	  Islamic	  Law,”	  in	  The	  Traditional	  Near	  East,	  edited	  by	  J.	  Stewart	  Robinson	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  NJ:	  Prentice-­‐Hall,	  
1966),	  p.	  131.	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intended	  to	  supplant	  the	  shariʿa;	  moreover,	  unlike	  pre-­‐Ottoman	  dynasties,	  the	  Ottomans	  entrusted	  
ordinary	  courts	  with	  the	  enforcement	  of	  Ottoman	  qanun,	  instead	  of	  establishing	  special	  courts	  staffed	  
largely	  (if	  not	  exclusively)	  from	  the	  executive/military	  branch	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  
	   The	  Ottoman	  constitution’s	  solution	  to	  the	  relationship	  of	  state	  and	  religion	  began	  to	  break	  
down	  early	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  however,	  when	  it	  became	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  the	  Ottomans	  no	  longer	  
had	  the	  ability	  to	  provide	  security	  against	  threats	  from	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Russia.	  	  The	  external	  
weakness	  of	  the	  Ottomans	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Christian	  powers	  was	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  various	  one-­‐sided	  
commercial	  treaties	  that	  the	  Ottomans	  entered	  with	  European	  powers	  throughout	  the	  19th	  century	  –	  
known	  as	  the	  “Capitulations”	  –	  that	  insulated	  the	  nationals	  of	  capitulatory	  powers	  from	  the	  jurisdiction	  
of	  Ottoman	  courts	  and	  often	  gave	  capitulatory	  powers	  veto	  powers	  over	  internal	  Ottoman	  economic	  
policies.	  	  Neither	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  nor	  Ottoman	  civil	  society,	  however,	  greeted	  these	  negative	  
developments	  with	  equanimity	  or	  assumed	  that	  decline	  and	  defeat	  was	  inevitable.	  	  The	  Ottoman	  state,	  
beginning	  in	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  launched	  an	  ambitious	  reform	  project	  known	  as	  the	  
tanẓīmāt,	  “the	  new	  order.”	  	  The	  new	  order	  introduced	  radical	  institutional	  innovation	  throughout	  the	  
Ottoman	  military,	  civilian	  and	  judicial	  bureaucracies,	  including,	  adoption	  of	  numerous	  European	  legal	  
codes	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  courts	  to	  administer	  them.	  The	  new	  order	  also	  introduced	  new	  systems	  
of	  public	  finance	  as	  the	  Ottomans	  attempted	  to	  place	  the	  finances	  of	  the	  Empire	  on	  a	  more	  secure	  
footing.	  	  The	  Ottomans	  also	  embarked	  on	  an	  ambitious	  project	  to	  codify	  the	  Ḥanafī	  school	  of	  Islamic	  law	  
–	  the	  official	  legal	  school	  of	  the	  Empire	  –	  that	  produced,	  upon	  its	  completion,	  the	  highly-­‐influential	  
multi-­‐volume	  compilation	  of	  Islamic	  civil	  law	  known	  as	  al-­‐Majalla.38	  	  	  
	   The	  radical	  nature	  of	  Ottoman	  institutional	  reforms,	  combined	  with	  its	  conscious	  emulation	  of	  
European	  models	  of	  governance	  and	  its	  ever-­‐increasing	  integration	  into	  the	  European	  state	  system,	  
produced	  a	  backlash	  against	  the	  reforms,	  particularly	  among	  groups	  with	  vested	  interests	  in	  the	  old	  
institutions.	  The	  new	  order	  also	  raised	  the	  ire	  of	  conservative	  elements	  within	  the	  religious	  
establishment,	  and	  making	  common	  cause	  with	  other	  disgruntled	  interest	  groups,	  they	  accused	  the	  new	  
reforms	  of	  effectively	  abandoning	  the	  Islamic	  basis	  of	  the	  state	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  European	  (Christian)	  
conception	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Contemporaneously	  with	  these	  institutional	  reforms,	  many	  Ottoman	  
intellectuals,	  including	  religious	  scholars,	  became	  prominent	  defenders	  not	  only	  of	  the	  new	  order,	  but	  
also	  of	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  European	  institutions	  that	  Ottoman	  reforms	  sought	  to	  introduce	  to	  the	  
Empire	  from	  an	  Islamic	  perspective.	  	  In	  making	  Islamic	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  reform,	  this	  group	  of	  
reformers	  set	  themselves	  on	  a	  course	  that	  challenged	  the	  religious	  establishment,	  which,	  for	  the	  large	  
part,	  was	  either	  indifferent	  or	  hostile	  to	  the	  new	  order	  as	  contrary	  to	  Islamic	  law.39	  
	   Three	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century	  thinkers	  were	  especially	  prominent	  in	  providing	  
grounds	  legitimating	  the	  new	  order,	  and	  ultimately	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  an	  Islamic	  theory	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  	   For	  a	  detailed	  but	  critical	  account	  of	  the	  Tanẓīmāt	  as	  a	  betrayal	  of	  the	  Islamic	  tradition,	  see	  Hallaq,	  pp.	  
401-­‐42.	  	  For	  a	  more	  sympathetic	  account	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Tanẓīmāt,	  see	  Fadel,	  pp.	  114-­‐19	  and	  Butrus	  Abu-­‐
Manneh,	  “The	  Islamic	  Roots	  of	  the	  Gülhane	  Rescript,”	  34	  Die	  Welt	  des	  Islams	  173	  (1994).	  
	  
39	  	   The	  following	  account	  is	  drawn	  from	  Mohammad	  Fadel,	  “Modernist	  Islamic	  Political	  Thought	  and	  the	  
Egyptian	  and	  Tunisian	  Revolutions	  of	  2011,”	  3	  Middle	  East	  Law	  and	  Governance	  94,	  98-­‐104	  (2011).	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popular	  sovereignty	  in	  opposition	  to	  autocratic	  politics.	  	  These	  thinkers	  are	  the	  Egyptian,	  Rafiʿ	  Rifāʿa	  al-­‐
Tahṭāwī,	  the	  Tunisian,	  Khayr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Tūnisī,	  and	  the	  Syrian,	  Rashīd	  Riḍā.	  	  Al-­‐Tahṭāwī’s	  career	  as	  a	  public	  
intellectual	  and	  advocate	  of	  reform	  began	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  lengthy	  sojourn	  in	  Paris	  as	  a	  religious	  adviser	  
to	  a	  group	  of	  Egyptians	  who	  had	  been	  sent	  by	  Muhammad	  ʿAlī,	  the	  Ottoman	  governor	  of	  Egypt,	  to	  study	  
various	  modern	  sciences	  in	  Paris.	  	  While	  in	  Paris,	  Tahṭāwī	  mastered	  French,	  and	  proved	  himself	  to	  be	  an	  
avid	  student	  of	  French	  culture,	  politics	  and	  law.	  When	  he	  returned	  to	  Egypt,	  he	  published	  a	  memoir	  of	  
his	  days	  in	  Paris	  in	  which	  he	  discussed	  in	  detail	  and	  with	  great	  approval,	  the	  structure	  of	  France’s	  
constitutional	  monarchy,	  and	  the	  French	  commitment	  to	  political	  equality	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  all	  of	  
which	  produced	  a	  polity	  that	  was	  capable	  of	  upholding	  justice,	  promoting	  prosperity,	  securing	  the	  rights	  
of	  French	  citizens	  and	  effectively	  restricting	  the	  arbitrary	  power	  of	  the	  ruler.	  	  For	  Tahṭāwī	  the	  prosperity	  
of	  the	  French	  state	  and	  French	  citizens	  was	  best	  explained	  by	  the	  justice	  of	  its	  constitution	  and	  the	  
rationality	  of	  its	  laws	  that	  guaranteed	  the	  citizens	  freedom	  from	  arbitrary	  government	  interference	  in	  
their	  lives.	  	  	  
Tahṭāwī’s	  praise	  of	  the	  French	  polity	  did	  not,	  however,	  lead	  him	  to	  question	  his	  convictions	  as	  a	  
Muslim	  or	  in	  the	  efficacy	  of	  Islamic	  law	  as	  the	  basic	  law	  of	  his	  civilization.	  	  Instead,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  
progress	  he	  witnessed	  in	  France,	  and	  by	  extension	  all	  of	  Europe,	  was	  based	  on	  Islamic	  foundations	  that	  
Europeans	  were	  able,	  through	  assiduous	  practice	  and	  continual	  development,	  to	  perfect.	  	  Accordingly,	  
he	  called	  for	  rulers	  in	  Muslim	  states	  to	  commit	  themselves	  to	  a	  program	  of	  legal	  reform	  that	  would	  
provide	  the	  same	  benefits	  of	  modern	  civilization	  enjoyed	  by	  Europeans	  to	  the	  Muslim	  world.	  	  From	  an	  
ideological	  perspective,	  Tahṭāwī	  emphasized	  that	  such	  a	  reform	  program	  needed	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  
Islamic	  revelation	  (sharʿ)	  and	  not	  human	  reason	  (ʿaql),	  even	  though	  he	  argued	  that	  from	  a	  substantive	  
perspective,	  both	  sources	  lead	  to	  substantially	  the	  same	  results.	  	  Crucially,	  Tahṭāwī	  argued	  that	  the	  ruler	  
continued	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  sharīʿa	  as	  articulated	  by	  the	  jurists,	  meaning,	  that	  the	  state	  was	  not	  
entitled	  to	  its	  own	  interpretations	  of	  the	  shariʿa	  but	  could	  only	  legislate	  based	  on	  norms	  developed	  by	  
the	  jurists	  themselves.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  state	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  mandatory	  norms	  of	  the	  shariʿa,	  
but	  could	  use	  its	  supererogatory	  norms	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  implementing	  progressive	  legislation.	  	  	  
The	  goal	  of	  such	  modern	  legislation	  is	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  perfection	  of	  the	  homeland,	  and	  
this	  requires	  a	  practical	  synthesis	  between	  rational	  and	  revealed	  law.	  	  But	  achievement	  of	  this	  goal	  is	  
not	  achieved	  solely	  through	  a	  wise	  law-­‐giver;	  it	  also	  requires	  properly	  motivated	  subjects	  of	  the	  law	  
who,	  because	  of	  their	  own	  moral	  commitments	  to	  the	  law	  –	  and	  here	  religion	  and	  patriotism	  mix	  –	  
internalize	  the	  law	  and	  zealously	  insure	  that	  its	  norms	  are	  upheld,	  not	  only	  against	  others	  in	  society	  who	  
would	  violate	  the	  rights	  of	  their	  fellow	  citizens,	  but	  also	  against	  the	  arbitrary	  action	  of	  the	  state.	  
Khayr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Tunisī,	  who	  was	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  governor	  of	  Tunisia	  and	  then	  
later	  became	  the	  Grand	  	  Vizier	  in	  Istanbul,	  also	  wrote	  an	  influential	  work	  in	  which	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  
reforms	  instituted	  by	  the	  Ottomans,	  far	  from	  undermining	  the	  role	  of	  the	  shariʿa,	  were	  in	  fact	  necessary	  
to	  restore	  its	  effectiveness.	  	  Arguing	  that	  the	  relative	  decay	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  
decline	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  concomitant	  rise	  of	  lawlessness,	  he	  concluded	  that	  the	  tanzimat	  were	  
intended	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  by	  instituting	  greater	  accountability	  to	  the	  
law	  and	  creating	  new	  institutions	  that	  were	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  	  He	  directed	  his	  
criticism	  to	  two	  kinds	  of	  critics	  of	  the	  tanzimat.	  The	  first	  argument	  was	  directed	  against	  those	  who	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believed	  that	  the	  reforms	  undermined	  the	  shariʿa	  insofar	  as	  they	  altered	  indigenous	  Muslim	  institutions	  
in	  favor	  of	  non-­‐Muslim	  models	  of	  governance.	  	  The	  second	  argument	  was	  directed	  against	  those	  who	  
believed	  that	  the	  ruler’s	  prerogatives	  to	  pursue	  the	  public	  good	  were	  absolute	  and	  public	  officials,	  in	  
order	  to	  perform	  their	  duties	  effectively,	  could	  not	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  views	  of	  the	  ruled.	  
To	  both	  groups	  of	  critics	  of	  the	  reforms	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  prosperity	  of	  states	  is	  dependent	  on	  
the	  rule	  of	  law	  as	  the	  essential	  means	  to	  fight	  arbitrary	  and	  despotic	  rule.	  	  The	  rule	  of	  law	  was	  satisfied	  
through	  effective	  commitments	  to	  both	  revealed	  law	  (the	  shariʿa)	  and	  rational	  positive	  law	  (qānūn).	  
When	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  was	  strong	  according	  to	  Tūnisī,	  its	  rulers	  were	  effectively	  bound	  by	  both	  sets	  of	  
norms,	  but	  decay	  set	  in	  when	  public	  officials	  were	  no	  longer	  effectively	  constrained	  by	  either.	  	  The	  
tanzimat	  were	  simply	  a	  species	  of	  rational	  law	  that	  were	  necessary	  to	  make	  the	  shariʿa	  effective	  and	  
could	  not,	  therefore,	  be	  fairly	  accused	  of	  replacing	  the	  shariʿa	  with	  non-­‐Islamic	  law.	  	  But	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  making	  the	  shariʿa	  effective	  requires	  its	  rules	  to	  be	  formulated	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  responsive	  to	  
contemporary	  problems	  and	  not	  in	  the	  frozen	  and	  static	  manner	  found	  in	  the	  medieval	  treatises	  that	  the	  
traditional	  legal	  elite	  spent	  years	  mastering	  in	  their	  theo-­‐juridical	  studies.	  	  Making	  the	  shariʿa	  effective	  in	  
the	  modern	  era	  would	  require	  collaboration	  between	  these	  juristic	  elites	  and	  modern	  technocratic	  
elites,	  with	  the	  latter	  explaining	  to	  the	  former	  the	  various	  policy	  goals	  sought	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  modern	  
lawmaking,	  and	  the	  former	  providing	  technical	  advice	  as	  to	  drafting	  rules	  in	  a	  form	  that	  would	  be	  
consistent	  with	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  shariʿa.	  	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  prerogatives	  of	  public	  officials	  had	  to	  be	  limited	  by	  law	  in	  order	  to	  insure	  that	  
public	  officials	  fulfilled	  their	  duties.	  	  Al-­‐Tūnisī	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  no	  dispute	  in	  Islamic	  law	  that	  the	  
exercise	  of	  discretion	  was	  only	  legitimate	  if	  it	  furthered	  the	  public	  good	  (al-­‐maṣlaḥa).	  	  According	  to	  al-­‐
Tūnisī,	  however,	  a	  public	  official	  who	  acts	  unilaterally	  and	  despotically	  –	  even	  if	  sincerely	  –	  was	  likely	  to	  
err	  in	  his	  determinations	  of	  the	  public	  good.	  	  The	  world	  was	  simply	  too	  complex	  for	  a	  single	  decision	  
maker	  to	  discern	  the	  public	  good	  consistently	  without	  the	  inputs	  of	  others,	  to	  say	  nothing	  of	  the	  risks	  
that	  despotic	  decision	  making	  poses	  to	  the	  public	  good	  when	  the	  official	  is	  corrupt.	  	  	  
The	  rule	  of	  law,	  which	  consists	  of	  both	  rational	  and	  revealed	  norms,	  is	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  
despotic	  decision	  making	  and	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  decisions	  of	  public	  officials	  are	  in	  fact	  
consistent	  with	  the	  public	  good.	  	  Laws,	  however,	  are	  not	  self-­‐executing,	  and	  they	  cannot	  prevent	  
arbitrary	  rule	  unless	  groups	  of	  people	  in	  society	  stand	  ever	  ready	  to	  defend	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  law	  
against	  those	  who	  would	  violate	  the	  law’s	  demands,	  particularly	  when	  those	  who	  violate	  the	  law	  are	  
public	  officials.	  	  The	  challenge	  of	  the	  reformist	  for	  al-­‐Tūnisī	  then	  was	  not	  determination	  of	  the	  content	  of	  
just	  law	  –	  which	  by	  hypothesis	  included	  both	  revealed	  law	  and	  rational	  law	  –	  but	  rather	  to	  establish	  
institutions	  and	  produce	  citizens	  that	  wold	  uphold	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  against	  the	  ever-­‐present	  
risk	  of	  despotism.	  	  The	  tanzimat	  served	  the	  institutional	  demands	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  rule	  of	  law:	  al-­‐Tūnisī	  
stated	  that	  parliaments,	  newspapers,	  public	  councils,	  etc.,	  are	  all	  institutions	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  
monitor	  the	  performance	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  ensure	  that	  they	  in	  fact	  operate	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  
Religion,	  more	  specifically,	  Islam,	  supplied	  the	  moral,	  inward	  force	  for	  the	  vitality	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  
according	  to	  al-­‐Tūnisī,	  a	  Muslim’s	  religious	  belief	  serves	  as	  an	  internal	  motive	  (wāziʿ),	  particularly	  
through	  the	  Islamic	  doctrine	  of	  commanding	  the	  good	  and	  prohibiting	  the	  evil	  (al-­‐amr	  bi’l-­‐maʿrūf	  wa’l-­‐
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nahy	  ʿan	  al-­‐munkar),	  predisposing	  Muslims	  to	  monitor	  the	  performance	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  hold	  them	  
accountable	  for	  breaches	  of	  the	  law.	  
Muḥammad	  Rashīd	  Riḍā,	  the	  Syrian	  disciple	  of	  the	  celebrated	  Egyptian	  religious	  reformer	  
Muḥammad	  ʿAbduh,	  writing	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  following	  its	  defeat	  in	  
World	  War	  I,	  and	  the	  decision	  of	  Turkish	  Republic	  to	  dissolve	  the	  caliphate,	  called	  upon	  Muslims	  to	  
establish	  a	  renewed	  caliphate	  dedicated	  to	  comprehensive	  religious,	  political	  and	  moral	  reform	  of	  the	  
Islamic	  world.	  For	  Riḍā,	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Muslim	  that	  made	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  domination	  of	  
Europeans	  was	  despotism,	  political	  and	  religious.	  	  According	  to	  Riḍā,	  the	  rulers	  and	  religious	  scholars	  
entered	  into	  a	  compact	  pursuant	  to	  which	  the	  latter	  would	  not	  question	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  rulers,	  and	  
instead	  counsel	  the	  people	  that	  their	  duty	  was	  to	  obey	  the	  rulers	  without	  fail	  (except	  in	  certain	  narrow	  
circumstances),	  even	  if	  their	  policies	  were	  contrary	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  	  The	  quid	  pro	  quo	  for	  this	  
agreement	  was	  that	  the	  rulers	  agreed	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  religious	  scholars,	  even	  
if	  those	  doctrines	  were	  contrary	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  	  	  
The	  doctrine	  of	  absolute	  (or	  virtually	  absolute)	  obedience	  in	  the	  political	  realm	  was	  thus	  coupled	  
with	  the	  doctrine	  of	  absolute	  obedience	  in	  religious	  matters,	  both	  of	  which	  stripped	  individual	  Muslims	  
of	  their	  individual	  dignity	  (ʿizza)	  and	  imposed	  upon	  them	  a	  regime	  of	  servility	  (dhull)	  that	  rendered	  them	  
incapable	  of	  resisting	  imperialism.	  Reform	  required	  changes	  to	  Islamic	  law	  so	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  
produced	  solely	  through	  the	  hermeneutical	  techniques	  of	  traditional	  jurisprudence	  and	  instead	  would	  
be	  produced	  through	  collective	  deliberations	  in	  which	  the	  public	  good	  (maṣlaḥa)	  would	  be	  more	  
fundamental	  than	  fidelity	  to	  the	  text	  of	  revelation.	  	  Political	  despotism	  would	  be	  resolved	  by	  rejection	  of	  
the	  doctrine	  of	  an	  absolute	  duty	  of	  obedience	  to	  the	  ruler	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  popular	  
sovereignty,	  and	  that	  all	  legitimate	  power	  came	  exclusively	  from	  the	  people.	  Accordingly,	  Riḍā	  
formulated	  the	  notion	  that	  Islam	  required	  some	  kind	  of	  republican	  form	  of	  government	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  
for	  the	  moral	  and	  political	  reform	  of	  Muslim	  society	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  escape	  the	  domination	  of	  external	  
powers.	  	  This	  could	  not	  take	  place,	  however,	  until	  Muslims	  were	  liberated	  from	  the	  political	  despotism	  
of	  their	  rulers	  and	  the	  religious	  despotism	  of	  the	  theologians.	  	  Politically,	  this	  required	  a	  revived	  
caliphate	  that	  was	  based	  on	  the	  actual	  consent	  of	  the	  community;	  religiously,	  this	  meant	  liberation	  of	  
Islamic	  law	  from	  the	  shackles	  placed	  on	  it	  by	  the	  doctrine	  of	  deference	  –	  taqlīd	  –	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  
independent	  reasoning	  –	  ijtihād	  –	  in	  law,	  derived	  through	  a	  public	  deliberative	  process	  that	  took	  into	  
account	  both	  revealed	  and	  secular	  sources.	  	  	  
While	  none	  of	  these	  thinkers	  advocated	  a	  liberal	  conception	  of	  the	  state,	  or	  even	  necessarily	  a	  
liberal	  conception	  of	  religion,	  they	  were	  all	  united	  in	  giving	  the	  state	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  
religious	  norms	  as	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  both	  the	  material	  and	  the	  moral	  progress	  of	  the	  individuals	  
under	  its	  rule.	  Moreover,	  they	  all	  agreed,	  even	  if	  they	  deployed	  their	  arguments	  in	  different	  contexts	  
and	  for	  different	  ends,	  that	  reform	  required	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  Muslim	  political	  subjectivity,	  
one	  that	  would	  produce	  citizens	  who	  would	  be	  actively	  involved	  in	  public	  governance,	  whether	  through	  
the	  articulation	  of	  political	  and	  moral	  norms,	  or	  monitoring	  public	  and	  private	  behavior	  to	  ensure	  its	  
conformity	  with	  the	  law.	  	  All	  three	  of	  them,	  to	  different	  extents,	  then	  elevated	  public	  political	  life	  over	  
the	  interpretive	  activities	  of	  the	  religious	  class	  which,	  although	  not	  to	  be	  dismissed	  out	  of	  hand,	  were	  to	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be	  largely	  subordinated	  to	  what	  each	  of	  them	  agreed	  was	  the	  key	  to	  reform:	  a	  morally	  and	  politically	  
revitalized	  state	  and	  citizenry.40	  	  
4. The	  Divide	  Between	  Republican	  Islam	  and	  Authoritarian	  Islam	  in	  Post-­‐Revolutionary	  Egypt	  
The	  religious	  fissures	  between	  traditionalist	  Islam	  and	  modernist	  reformers	  described	  in	  Section	  341	  
continued	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century	  in	  Egypt,	  despite	  the	  nationalization	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  
of	  the	  oldest	  center	  of	  religious	  education	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  Azhar	  in	  1961.42	  	  When	  al-­‐Azhar	  re-­‐emerged	  as	  
an	  independent	  institutional	  actor	  in	  the	  1970s	  during	  the	  reign	  of	  President	  Sadat,	  it	  remained	  
thoroughly	  committed	  to	  a	  top-­‐down	  conception	  of	  Islam’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  state,	  arguing	  that	  the	  
state	  was	  obligated	  to	  implement	  Islamic	  law	  without	  prior	  democratic	  deliberation.43	  The	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood,	  while	  nominally	  allied	  with	  the	  Azhar	  insofar	  as	  the	  principle	  demand	  of	  both	  was	  the	  
restoration	  of	  Islamic	  law	  as	  Egypt’s	  basic	  law,	  began	  halting	  steps	  toward	  embracing	  democracy	  in	  the	  
1980s,	  when	  it	  agreed	  to	  compete	  in	  parliamentary	  elections.44	  Any	  tension	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  
respective	  approaches	  of	  the	  Azhar	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  however,	  was	  largely	  irrelevant	  so	  
long	  as	  Egypt	  was	  firmly	  governed	  by	  an	  authoritarian	  state,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  their	  mutual	  opposition	  to	  
the	  violence	  of	  Islamic	  militants	  and	  their	  mutual	  commitment	  to	  Islamizing	  Egyptian	  civil	  society	  
through	  preaching.	  	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  both	  the	  Azhar	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  could	  pursue	  
their	  respective	  agendas	  without	  worry	  about	  their	  deeper	  political	  disagreements.	  	  Divisions	  on	  how	  
Islamic	  law	  should	  be	  implemented,	  however,	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  ignored	  after	  the	  success	  of	  the	  2011	  
Revolution,	  with	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  taking	  the	  position,	  even	  if	  only	  for	  tactical	  reasons,	  that	  the	  
representative	  institutions	  of	  the	  state	  should	  be	  given	  the	  final	  word	  in	  defining	  the	  content	  of	  Islamic	  
law,	  while	  the	  Azhar	  strove	  for	  recognition	  that	  it	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  ultimate	  arbiter	  of	  Islam,	  including	  
the	  content	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  in	  Egypt.	  	  	  
The	  post-­‐revolutionary	  battle	  between	  the	  advocates	  of	  what	  I	  am	  calling	  “republican”	  Islam	  
and	  “authoritarian”	  Islam	  was	  fought	  out	  largely	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  while	  many	  religious	  figures	  were	  
involved	  in	  these	  debates,	  two	  figures	  stand	  out:	  Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī	  (b.	  1926),	  as	  the	  exemplar	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  	   Indira	  Falk	  Gesnik,	  Islamic	  Reform	  and	  Conservativism	  –	  al-­‐Azhar	  and	  the	  Evolution	  of	  Modern	  Sunnī	  Islam	  
(New	  York:	  I.B.	  Tauris	  Publishers,	  2010)	  (“the	  modernists’	  vision	  of	  lay	  ijtihad	  constituted	  a	  democratization	  of	  
religious	  knowledge	  that	  would	  motivate	  against	  arbitrary	  exercise	  of	  power.”).	  p.	  234.	  
	  
41	  	   For	  a	  thorough	  overview	  of	  the	  at	  times	  nasty	  politics	  that	  took	  place	  between	  and	  among	  the	  Khedive	  of	  
Egypt,	  British	  officials	  in	  Egypt,	  traditionalist	  religious	  scholars	  suspicious	  of	  religious	  reforms	  and	  modernist	  
reformers,	  see	  ibid.,	  pp.	  165-­‐96.	  
	  
42	  	   Following	  the	  Free	  Officers’	  coup	  in	  1952,	  however,	  both	  traditionalist	  religious	  figures	  and	  reformists	  
suffered	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  military	  regime,	  with	  the	  regime	  doing	  its	  best	  to	  domesticate	  the	  Azhar	  (and	  largely	  
succeeding,	  at	  least	  throughout	  the	  60s),	  and	  to	  eliminate	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  	  Malika	  Zeghal,	  “Religion	  and	  
Politics	  in	  Egypt:	  The	  Ulema	  of	  al-­‐Azhar,	  Radical	  Islam	  and	  the	  State	  (1952-­‐94),”	  31,3	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Middle	  East	  Studies	  (1999),	  pp.	  371-­‐99.	  	  	  	  
	  
43	  	   Ibid.,	  pp.	  382-­‐83.	  	  	  
	  
44	  	   See	  n.	  1,	  supra.	  
	  18	  
	  
“republican”	  Islam,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  as	  the	  exemplar	  of	  “authoritarian”	  Islam,	  on	  the	  
other.	  	  	  Both	  are	  Egyptians,	  but	  their	  respective	  careers	  took	  radically	  different	  paths	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  
respective	  stances	  toward	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  	  Qaraḍāwī,	  who	  grew	  up	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  era	  when	  parts	  
of	  Egypt	  were	  still	  under	  British	  occupation,	  from	  early	  on	  developed	  an	  adversarial	  stance	  toward	  the	  
Egyptian	  government,	  and	  was	  imprisoned	  at	  various	  times,	  both	  by	  the	  monarchy	  and,	  following	  the	  
overthrow	  of	  King	  Farūq	  in	  1952,	  Egypt’s	  military	  rulers.	  	  He	  left	  Egypt	  for	  Qatar	  in	  the	  early	  1960s,	  not	  
returning	  again	  to	  Egypt	  until	  the	  Egyptian	  Revolution	  of	  2011.	  	  During	  his	  lengthy	  and	  prolific	  career,	  
Qaraḍāwī	  sought	  to	  maintain	  what	  he	  called	  a	  centrist	  “wasaṭī”	  conception	  of	  Islam,	  one	  that	  was	  
neither	  slavish	  to	  inherited	  historical	  doctrines,	  nor	  one	  that	  would	  secularize	  Islam	  and	  reduce	  it	  to	  
private	  belief.	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Egyptian	  Revolution	  of	  2011	  broke	  out,	  Qaraḍāwī	  had	  become	  a	  leading	  
figure	  of	  global	  Islam,	  a	  position	  earned	  in	  part	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  prolific	  writings	  and	  his	  weekly	  satellite	  
TV	  show	  al-­‐Sharīʿa	  wa’l-­‐Ḥayāt	  [Sharīʿa	  and	  Life],	  which	  was	  broadcast	  throughout	  the	  Arab	  world	  on	  the	  
Qatari	  news	  station,	  al-­‐Jazeera.45	  	  	  	  
	   ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  by	  contrast,	  pursued	  a	  career	  within	  the	  official	  Egyptian	  religious	  establishment,	  
eventually	  becoming	  the	  official	  Mufti	  of	  Egypt	  when	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  appointed	  him	  to	  that	  post	  in	  
2003.46	  	  The	  Mufti	  of	  Egypt	  is	  head	  of	  the	  Dār	  al-­‐Iftāʾ	  [Department	  of	  Islamic	  Legal	  Opinions],	  a	  division	  
of	  the	  Egyptian	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  which	  was	  established	  by	  a	  decree	  of	  the	  Khedive	  ʿAbbās	  Ḥilmī	  in	  
1895.	  	  One	  of	  several	  governmental	  institutions	  that	  represent	  establishment	  Islam	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  Dār	  al-­‐
Iftāʾ’s	  position	  inside	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  gives	  it	  a	  more	  central	  role	  than	  other	  state	  religious	  
institutions	  in	  the	  legal	  articulation	  of	  Islam	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  legality,	  from	  an	  
Islamic	  perspective,	  of	  certain	  actions	  of	  the	  state,	  particularly,	  when	  the	  state	  chooses	  to	  deploy	  capital	  
punishment	  against	  convicted	  criminals.47	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   In	  many	  respects,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  find	  major	  substantive	  disagreements	  between	  either	  
Qaraḍāwī	  or	  Jumuʿa	  on	  fundamental	  matters	  of	  Islamic	  law	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  modern	  
world.	  	  Both	  of	  them,	  for	  example,	  reject	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Islam	  that	  would	  limit	  it	  to	  a	  question	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  	   Western	  academics	  have	  published	  several	  works	  on	  Qaraḍāwī’s	  life	  and	  thought.	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  
Global	  Mufti:	  the	  Phenomenon	  of	  Yusuf	  al-­‐Qaradawi,	  edited	  by	  Jakob	  Skovgaard-­‐Peterson	  and	  Bettina	  Gräf	  
(London:	  Hurst	  &	  Co.,	  2009);	  Gudrun	  Krämer,	  “Drawing	  Boundaries:	  Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī	  on	  Apostasy,”	  in	  Speaking	  
for	  Islam:	  Religious	  Authorities	  in	  Muslim	  Societies,	  edited	  by	  Gudrun	  Krämer	  and	  Sabine	  Schmidtke	  (Boston:	  Brill,	  
2006),	  pp.	  181-­‐217	  (with	  a	  useful	  biography,	  pp.	  184-­‐200);	  and,	  Deina	  Ali	  Abdelkader,	  Islamic	  Activists:	  the	  Anti-­‐
Enlightenment	  Democrats	  (New	  York:	  Pluto	  Press,	  2011),	  pp.	  43-­‐65	  .	  	  For	  an	  accessible	  on-­‐line	  biography	  of	  
Qaraḍāwī,	  see	  Ana	  Belen	  Soage,	  Shaykh	  Yusuf	  al-­‐Qaradawi:	  Portrait	  of	  a	  Leading	  Islamist	  Cleric,	  available	  at	  
http://www.gloria-­‐center.org/2008/03/soage-­‐2008-­‐03-­‐05/.	  (last	  viewed,	  February	  8,	  2015).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
46	  	   ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa’s	  life	  and	  writings	  have	  not	  been	  as	  extensively	  studied	  as	  those	  of	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī’s.	  	  For	  a	  basic	  
overview	  of	  his	  life	  and	  work,	  see	  Heba	  Raouf	  Ezzat,	  “Gumaa,	  Ali,”	  The	  Oxford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  the	  Islamic	  World.	  
	  
47	  	   For	  background	  on	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  Dār	  al-­‐Iftāʾ	  to	  the	  Egyptian	  state,	  see	  Jakob	  Skovgaard-­‐Petersen,	  
Defining	  Islam	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  State:	  Muftis	  and	  Fatwas	  of	  the	  Dār	  al-­‐Iftāʾ	  (New	  York:	  Brill,	  1997).	  	  See	  also,	  Peri	  




private	  belief.48	  	  Although	  both	  of	  them	  reject	  slavish	  adherence	  to	  the	  historical	  tradition	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  
neither	  has	  much	  sympathy	  for	  those	  who	  would	  cast	  it	  out	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  While	  each	  believes	  that	  the	  
historical	  tradition	  of	  Islamic	  law	  should	  be	  drawn	  upon	  in	  formulating	  practical	  solutions	  for	  both	  
individual	  Muslims	  and	  Muslim-­‐majority	  societies,	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  respect	  for	  historical	  Islamic	  
law	  precludes	  adopting	  new	  solutions	  in	  light	  of	  the	  present	  circumstances	  and	  present	  needs	  of	  the	  
Muslim	  community.	  	  Theologically,	  both	  accept	  an	  ecumenical	  understanding	  of	  Islam	  that	  rejects	  
sectarianism	  and	  anathematization	  of	  dissident	  Muslim	  sects	  as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  common	  adherence	  
to	  The	  Amman	  Message	  of	  2006.49	  	  Finally,	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  just	  like	  Qaraḍāwī,	  repeatedly	  emphasizes	  the	  
need	  call	  people	  to	  a	  centrist	  conception	  of	  Islam	  (wasaṭī).50	  	  	  
	   Prior	  to	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  with	  the	  durability	  of	  Arab	  authoritarian	  orders	  unquestioned,	  the	  
differences	  between	  the	  two	  men,	  and	  their	  conceptions	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  religion	  to	  state	  
authority,	  could	  be,	  and	  largely	  were,	  ignored.	  	  Once	  the	  Tunisian	  fruit	  vendor,	  Muhammad	  Buazizi	  
immolated	  himself,	  however,	  setting	  off	  a	  chain	  of	  revolutionary	  events	  across	  the	  Arab	  world,	  the	  
political	  differences	  between	  Qaraḍāwī	  and	  establishment	  representatives	  of	  Islam	  like	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  were	  
thrown	  into	  sharp	  relief.	  	  Qaraḍāwī,	  for	  example,	  while	  falling	  short	  of	  categorically	  absolving	  Al-­‐Buazizi	  
of	  the	  sin	  of	  suicide,	  placed	  responsibility	  for	  his	  actions	  on	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  Tunisia,	  and	  by	  
analogy,	  condemned	  the	  entire	  Arab	  state	  system	  for	  producing	  a	  generation	  of	  youth	  pushed	  to	  the	  
brink	  of	  despair.51	  	  He	  also	  went	  on	  to	  express	  not	  only	  his	  profound	  hope	  that	  God	  would	  forgive	  
Buazizi	  his	  transgression,	  but	  also	  declared	  that	  Islam	  provides	  sufficient	  lawful	  means	  to	  resist	  tyranny	  
so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  Arab	  youth	  to	  resort	  to	  suicide	  instead	  of	  agitating	  for	  political	  change.52	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  	   When	  asked	  about	  the	  relationship	  of	  Islam	  to	  politics,	  for	  example,	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  while	  denying	  its	  role	  in	  
partisan	  politics,	  affirmed	  that	  “insofar	  as	  politics	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  good	  order	  of	  the	  community’s	  affairs	  .	  .	  .	  
and	  because	  religion	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  good	  order	  of	  the	  community’s	  affairs,	  it	  must	  be	  involved	  in	  politics	  
from	  that	  perspective	  (al-­‐siyāsa	  .	  .	  .	  riʿāyat	  shuʾūn	  al-­‐umma	  .	  .	  .	  wa	  naẓaran	  li-­‐ʾanna	  al-­‐dīn	  yarʿā	  shuʾūn	  al-­‐umma	  fa-­‐
huwa	  yataʿarraḍ	  li’l-­‐siyāsa	  min	  hādhihi	  al-­‐nāḥiya).”	  Aḥmad	  al-­‐Buḥairī,	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  Mutafāʾil	  bi-­‐Mustaqbal	  Miṣr	  wa	  
Lastu	  Nādiman	  ʿalā	  Ziyārat	  al-­‐Quds	  -­‐-­‐	  Ḥiwār	  [ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  is	  Optimistic	  About	  Egypt’s	  Future	  and	  ‘I	  do	  not	  regret	  
visiting	  Jerusalem’	  –	  a	  Dialogue],	  al-­‐Masrī	  al-­‐Yawm,	  July	  1,	  2014,	  available	  at	  
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/473719.	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  11,	  2015).	  
	  
49	  	   The	  principles	  of	  The	  Amman	  Message	  were	  three:	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  Islamic	  sects	  and	  the	  prohibition	  
of	  declaring	  adherents	  of	  these	  sects	  to	  be	  apostates;	  affirmation	  that	  the	  disagreements	  among	  Muslims	  is	  less	  
important	  than	  what	  unites	  them;	  and,	  the	  impermissibility	  of	  issuing	  legal	  opinions	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  requisite	  
qualifications	  or,	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  independent	  interpretation,	  to	  issue	  rulings	  that	  contradict	  well-­‐established	  
principles	  of	  Islam	  that	  are	  held	  by	  the	  various	  historical	  interpretations	  of	  Islam.	  The	  Amman	  Message,	  available	  
at	  http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=31.	  (Last	  viewed,	  
February	  8,	  2015).	  
	  
50	  	   On	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa’s	  substantive	  interpretations	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  see	  Ezzat,	  supra	  n.	  46.	  On	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī’s	  views	  
regarding	  modern	  Islamic	  law,	  see	  Krämer,	  “Drawing	  Boundaries,”	  pp.	  197-­‐200,	  supra	  n.	  45.	  
	  
51	  	   Al-­‐Shaykh	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī	  wa	  Raʾyuhu	  fī’-­‐ntiḥār	  Muḥammad	  al-­‐Būʿazīzī,	  available	  at	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJzS1IWJXrI.	  (last	  viewed,	  February	  10,	  2015).	  
	  




Arab	  religious	  establishments,	  such	  as	  al-­‐Azhar,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  merely	  reaffirmed	  orthodox	  Islamic	  
teachings	  that	  suicide	  is	  a	  grave	  sin,	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  cause,	  while	  completely	  ignoring	  the	  underlying	  
political	  message	  of	  Buazizi’s	  suicide.53	  	  	  
When	  the	  January	  25th	  Revolution	  broke	  out	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  men’s	  
understanding	  of	  politics	  and	  religion	  became	  even	  starker,	  with	  Qaraḍāwī	  standing	  staunchly	  on	  the	  
side	  of	  the	  revolutionaries,	  and	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  defending	  the	  regime	  of	  Hosni	  Mubarak.54	  	  When	  the	  July	  3rd	  
coup	  took	  place,	  their	  roles,	  predictably,	  were	  reversed,	  with	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  embracing	  the	  June	  30	  
protestors	  and	  resurrecting	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  Islamic	  doctrine	  that	  a	  legitimate	  ruler	  who	  loses	  his	  
effective	  power	  due	  to	  a	  coup	  or	  the	  like	  ceases	  to	  be	  the	  legitimate	  ruler,	  while	  Qaraḍāwī	  insisted	  that	  
legitimacy	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  can	  only	  be	  the	  result	  of	  free	  and	  fair	  elections,	  not	  military-­‐supported	  
popular	  demonstrations.55	  	  Indeed,	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  not	  only	  supported	  the	  coup,	  he	  also	  incited	  the	  Egyptian	  
military,	  in	  a	  sermon	  given	  to	  the	  armed	  forces	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  its	  senior	  leadership,	  to	  kill	  supporters	  
of	  the	  deposed	  president,	  urging	  them	  to	  “shoot	  to	  kill”	  (iḍrab	  fī’l-­‐malyān).56	  
	   It	  would	  be	  too	  easy	  to	  dismiss	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa’s	  pro-­‐military	  position	  as	  simply	  that	  of	  a	  sycophant	  
or	  a	  hypocrite	  ready	  to	  exploit	  religious	  doctrine	  to	  support	  his	  political	  master,	  a	  position	  that	  
Qaraḍāwī,	  in	  his	  various	  post-­‐coup	  polemics	  against	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  has	  regularly	  taken.	  	  The	  more	  
interesting	  question	  is	  why	  do	  so	  many	  well-­‐known	  religious	  scholars	  who	  are	  part	  of	  the	  religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/1/19/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%88%
D9%8A-­‐%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%AD-­‐%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D9%87-­‐%D9%85%D9%86-­‐
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%8A.	  (last	  viewed,	  February	  10,	  2015).	  
	  
53	  	   Al-­‐Azhar	  li-­‐muqallidi	  al-­‐bū	  ʿazīzī:	  al-­‐Islām	  yuḥarrim	  al-­‐intiḥār	  li-­‐ayyi	  sabab	  [Al-­‐Azhar	  to	  those	  imitating	  
Buazizi:	  ‘Islam	  prohibits	  suicide	  for	  any	  reason’],	  available	  at	  
http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/newsreports/islamic-­‐world/127961-­‐2011-­‐01-­‐18-­‐21-­‐41-­‐07.html.	  (last	  
viewed,	  February	  9,	  2015).	  
 
54	  	   Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī,	  Rudūd	  ʿIlmiyya	  ʿalā	  al-­‐Shaykh	  aw	  al-­‐Janirāl	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  [Scholarly	  Replies	  to	  the	  Shaykh	  
or	  “General”	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa],	  September	  18,	  2013,	  available	  at	  http://www.qaradawi.net/new/articles/6844-­‐2013-­‐09-­‐
02-­‐15-­‐08-­‐03	  .	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  10,	  2015).	  	  Recordings	  of	  some	  of	  his	  pro-­‐Mubarak	  statements	  are	  available	  
on	  YouTube,	  for	  example,	  Al-­‐Muftī	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  Athnāʾ	  Thawrat	  25	  Yanāyir	  Yuqaddim	  Taḥiyya	  li-­‐Mubārak	  wa	  
Yuḥarrim	  al-­‐Khurūj	  ʿalayhi	  [The	  Mufti	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  During	  the	  January	  25th	  Revolution	  Saluting	  Mubarak	  and	  
Declaring	  the	  Sinfulness	  of	  Opposing	  Him],	  available	  at	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFjg0pKk5qA.	  (Last	  
viewed,	  February	  10,	  2015).	  
	  
55	  	   Scholarly	  Replies;	  and,	  Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī,	  Radd	  ʿalā	  Muftī	  al-­‐ʿAskar	  [A	  Reply	  to	  the	  Mufti	  of	  the	  Armed	  
Forces],	  October	  11,	  2013,	  available	  at	  http://www.qaradawi.net/new/articles/6891-­‐2013-­‐10-­‐09-­‐21-­‐00-­‐30.	  (Last	  
viewed,	  February	  10,	  2015).	  
	  
56	  	   Reply	  to	  the	  Mufti;	  see	  also,	  Video	  Musarrab	  Li-­‐ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  li-­‐l-­‐Sīsī	  fī	  Ḥuḍūr	  al-­‐Sīsī	  ‘Iḍrab	  fī’l-­‐Malyān’	  [A	  
Smuggled	  Video	  of	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  in	  the	  Presence	  of	  al-­‐Sīsī	  ‘Shoot	  to	  Kill’],	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJzPVAQQEXc.	  (last	  seen,	  February	  10,	  2015).	  	  In	  this	  video,	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  
exhorts	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  cleanse	  Egypt	  of	  the	  former	  president’s	  supporters,	  even	  claiming	  that	  the	  army’s	  
position	  was	  vindicated	  by,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  “innumerable	  visions	  (tawātarat	  al-­‐ruʾā)	  of	  the	  Prophet	  of	  
God”	  that	  came	  to	  Egypt’s	  living	  saints	  in	  which	  he	  communicated	  to	  them	  his	  support	  for	  the	  military	  against	  the	  




establishment	  in	  various	  Muslim	  countries	  consistently	  oppose	  democratization,	  even	  when,	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  there	  was	  no	  attempt	  to	  remove	  them	  from	  their	  positions	  as	  interpreters	  
of	  a	  state-­‐supported	  religion?	  	  While	  it	  would	  be	  speculative	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  politics	  of	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  and	  
other	  traditionalist	  scholars	  who	  support	  authoritarian	  orders	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  
their	  adherence	  to	  the	  political	  philosophy	  articulated	  by	  medieval	  theologians	  such	  as	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  they	  
share	  a	  certain	  political	  aesthetic	  with	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  which	  assumes	  that	  a	  hierarchical	  order	  which	  unifies	  
symbolic	  (religious)	  authority	  and	  coercive	  power	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  social	  and	  
religious	  unity.	  	  	  
	   Accordingly,	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  in	  various	  interviews	  published	  in	  Egyptian	  newspapers,	  stresses	  the	  
need	  for	  national	  unity	  as	  a	  precondition	  for	  progress.57	  	  In	  another	  interview,	  he	  expressed	  his	  view	  
that	  “freedom	  means	  adhering	  to	  [proper]	  authority	  and	  legitimacy,	  not	  escaping	  [from	  them]	  and	  
following	  capricious	  whims	  or	  desires.”58	  	  What	  is	  most	  dangerous	  to	  national	  unity,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  ʿAlī	  
Jumuʿa	  and	  other	  traditionalists,	  however,	  is	  religious	  division,	  which	  they	  dismiss	  as	  “chaos	  in	  religious	  
discourse	  (fawḍā	  al-­‐khiṭāb	  al-­‐dīnī).”	  	  One	  of	  greatest	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  January	  25th	  Revolution	  
was	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  robust	  public	  sphere	  in	  which	  Egyptian	  citizens	  of	  all	  stripes	  were	  free	  to	  express	  their	  
views	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  topics,	  including	  religion,	  that	  for	  the	  previous	  fifty	  years	  had	  been	  subject	  to	  
strict	  state	  control.	  	  Religion	  was	  one	  of	  the	  fields	  which	  had	  suddenly	  become	  open	  to	  a	  radical	  
pluralism	  that	  establishmentarian	  theologians	  such	  as	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  found	  deeply	  troubling.	  	  Instead	  of	  
taking	  robust	  public	  discussion	  about	  religious	  affairs	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  people	  deeply	  committed	  to	  a	  
deeper	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  religion	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  their	  lives,	  establishment	  theologians	  took	  
the	  extent	  of	  public	  religious	  debate	  –	  and	  the	  disagreement	  it	  necessarily	  produced	  –	  as	  something	  
threatening	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  religion:	  
“Q.	  ‘Recently,	  non-­‐specialists	  have	  given	  many	  religious	  opinions	  (fatāwā)	  which	  have	  
produced	  much	  contention	  (jadal)	  and	  confusion	  (balbala)	  in	  society.	  	  What	  is	  your	  
opinion	  about	  that?’”	  
“A.	  ‘We	  refer	  to	  this	  condition	  as	  “chaos	  in	  religious	  discourse	  (fawḍā	  fī’l	  khiṭāb	  al-­‐
dīnī)”,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  [the	  actions	  of]	  some	  individuals	  who	  are	  only	  expressing	  
their	  personal	  views,	  not	  [the	  views	  of]	  official	  establishments	  (jiha	  rasmiyya).	  	  They	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  	   When	  asked	  by	  the	  interviewer	  how	  Egypt	  is	  to	  survive	  the	  transitional	  period	  safely,	  he	  replied	  “By	  
means	  of	  agreement	  and	  keeping	  far	  from	  disagreements	  (ʿan	  ṭarīq	  al-­‐ittifāq	  wa’l-­‐buʿd	  ʿan	  al-­‐khilāf).”	  Ibrāhīm	  
ʿImrān,	  al-­‐Duktūr	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa:	  Fawḍā	  al-­‐Khitāb	  al-­‐Dīnī	  wa’l-­‐Furqa	  wa’l-­‐Tanāḥur	  bayna	  Abnāʾ	  al-­‐Waṭan	  Abraz	  al-­‐
Taḥaddiyyāt	  Amām	  al-­‐Muftī	  al-­‐Jadīd	  [Dr.	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa:	  Chaotic	  Religious	  Discourse	  and	  Division	  and	  Conflict	  Among	  
the	  People	  Are	  the	  Gravest	  Challenges	  Facing	  the	  New	  Muftī],	  al-­‐Ahrām,	  February	  28,	  2013,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/133883.aspx.	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  11,	  2015).	  	  Jumuʿa’s	  suspicion	  of	  
disagreement	  and	  contention	  as	  destructive	  of	  national	  unity	  echoed	  concerns	  of	  religious	  conservatives	  of	  the	  
19th	  century	  who	  feared	  that	  calls	  from	  religious	  reformers	  to	  abandon	  traditional	  legal	  doctrines	  in	  favor	  of	  rules	  
derived	  from	  renewed	  independent	  interpretations	  of	  Islamic	  law	  would	  undermine	  established	  beliefs	  and	  
practices	  of	  the	  community	  and	  undermine	  the	  community’s	  unity.	  	  Gesnik,	  pp.	  179-­‐80.	  
 
58	  	   “Inna	  al-­‐ḥurriyya	  taʿnī	  al-­‐iltizām	  bi’l-­‐marjaʿiyya	  wa’l-­‐sharʿiyya	  wa	  lā	  taʿnī	  al-­‐tafallut	  wa’ttibāʿ	  al-­‐ahwāʾ.”	  	  	  




have	  created	  chaos	  in	  religious	  discourse.	  You	  might	  come	  across	  one	  of	  them	  
speaking	  about	  religion,	  and	  you	  are	  surprised	  to	  find	  yourself	  in	  front	  of	  a	  zealot	  
(mutashaddid),	  then	  go	  to	  another,	  and	  find	  him	  licentious	  (mutasayyib).	  	  You	  might	  
then	  go	  to	  a	  third	  and	  he	  is	  moderate	  (wasaṭan)	  or	  a	  fourth	  who	  reduces	  religion	  to	  
spiritual	  matters	  (rūḥāniyyāt)	  or	  a	  fifth	  who	  reduces	  religion	  to	  politics	  (siyāsa),	  and	  
so	  on	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  This	  produces	  a	  general	  condition	  among	  the	  people	  of	  confusion	  
and	  contention	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  numerous	  religious	  controversies	  emerging	  from	  
religious	  discourse.”59	  	  	  
Nor	  was	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  the	  only	  establishmentarian	  theologian	  in	  Egypt	  to	  express	  fears	  about	  the	  
subversive	  consequences	  of	  religious	  pluralism	  in	  Egyptian	  society.	  	  Shaykh	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Ḥamīd	  al-­‐Aṭrash,	  for	  
example,	  complained	  that	  “the	  people	  have	  become	  confused	  and	  contentious	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
differences	  of	  opinion.”60	  	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa,	  at	  a	  speech	  delivered	  at	  Singapore’s	  Nanyang	  Technological	  
University	  on	  June	  10,	  2014,	  even	  blamed	  the	  rise	  of	  religious	  extremism	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  on	  the	  
problem	  of	  the	  breakdown	  of	  religious	  authority	  and	  the	  concomitant	  spread	  of	  pluralistic	  religious	  
interpretations	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  unqualified	  religious	  autodidacts:	  
“[ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa]	  continued,	  saying	  that	  ‘Among	  the	  problems	  that	  confront	  the	  modern	  
world	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  authority.	  	  In	  Islam	  and	  also	  other	  religions,	  we	  are	  
witnessing	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  non-­‐specialists	  who	  lack	  sufficient	  religious	  education	  
but	  who	  nevertheless	  hold	  themselves	  out	  as	  religious	  authorities,	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	  they	  lack	  the	  preparation	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  speak	  about	  Islamic	  law	  (al-­‐
sharīʿa)	  and	  morality	  (akhlāq).	  This	  tendency	  has	  cast	  the	  door	  wide	  open	  for	  
extremist	  interpretations	  of	  Islam	  which	  have	  no	  foundation.	  	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  none	  
of	  these	  extremists	  have	  studied	  Islam	  in	  any	  recognized	  center	  of	  Islamic	  learning.	  	  
Rather,	  they	  [and	  their	  interpretations]	  are	  only	  the	  product	  of	  social	  conditions	  
brimming	  with	  problems.	  	  They	  have	  relied	  on	  perverted	  and	  distorted	  
interpretations	  [of	  religion]	  and	  they	  seek	  to	  spread	  chaos.’	  He	  went	  on	  to	  insist	  that	  
‘Our	  role	  as	  an	  Islamic	  religious	  leadership	  which	  has	  spent	  its	  entire	  life	  studying	  
religious	  texts	  is	  to	  restore	  [religious]	  authority	  by	  returning	  those	  who	  have	  solid	  
foundations	  of	  learning	  (qadam	  rāsikha	  fī’l-­‐ʿilm)	  [to	  their	  rightful	  position].’”61	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  	   Ibid.	  	  
	  
60	  	   “Al-­‐nās	  taḥayyarat	  wa	  tabalbalat	  min	  ikhtilāf	  al-­‐ārāʾ.”	  Walīd	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Raḥmān,	  Miṣr:	  Ṣaḥwa	  Azhariyya	  li’l-­‐
ḥadd	  min	  Fawḍā	  al-­‐Fatwā	  [The	  Azhar	  Awakens	  to	  Place	  a	  Limit	  on	  the	  Chaos	  of	  Religious	  Opinion],	  al-­‐Sharq	  al-­‐
Awsaṭ,	  September	  11,	  2012,	  available	  at	  
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=17&article=694740&issueno=12341#.VNyMMPnF8d8.	  (Last	  
viewed,	  February	  12,	  2015).	  
	  
61	  	   Ziyād	  Mujāhid,	  Alī	  Jumuʿa	  ‘Ghayr	  al-­‐Mutakhaṣṣiṣīn	  Yunaṣṣibūna	  Anfusahum	  Marjiʿiyyāt	  Dīniyya	  li-­‐Ithārat	  
al-­‐Fawḍā’	  [ʿAli	  Jumuʿa	  ‘Non-­‐Specialists	  Are	  Making	  Themselves	  Religious	  Authorities	  to	  Spread	  Chaos’],	  Al-­‐




In	  light	  of	  establishment	  theologians’	  fears	  of	  religious	  pluralism	  as	  a	  source	  of	  political	  
instability	  and	  religious	  disorder,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  they	  demanded	  that	  the	  state	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  
perceived	  crisis	  in	  religion	  stemming	  from	  the	  pluralism	  of	  the	  post-­‐Mubarak	  period.	  	  Accordingly,	  they	  
asked	  the	  state	  to	  pass	  a	  law	  that	  would,	  among	  other	  things,	  criminalize	  the	  public	  dissemination	  of	  
religious	  opinions	  unless	  the	  person	  giving	  the	  opinion	  was	  part	  of	  an	  official	  institution.62	  	  When	  a	  
journalist	  from	  the	  Ahram,	  the	  flagship	  newspaper	  of	  the	  state,	  asked	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  for	  his	  opinion	  
whether	  some	  laws	  were	  needed	  to	  limit	  the	  communication	  of	  religious	  opinions	  using	  mass	  media	  to	  
those	  who	  have	  been	  given	  special	  licenses	  granted	  to	  them	  by	  the	  Azhar,	  he	  replied	  that	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
gravity	  of	  the	  function	  of	  giving	  religious	  opinions,	  “it	  is	  necessary	  that	  this	  matter	  should	  be	  restricted	  
to	  specialized	  scholars,	  and	  that	  scholars	  who	  wish	  to	  assume	  this	  position	  be	  trained	  thoroughly	  so	  that	  
they	  possess	  the	  requisite	  qualifications	  for	  this	  grave	  task.”63	  	  Al-­‐Qaraḍāwī’s	  writings	  also	  are	  cognizant	  
of	  the	  danger	  of	  religious	  extremism	  that	  emerged	  in	  a	  context	  where	  enthusiasm	  surpassed	  learning.	  	  
Unlike	  his	  establishmentarian	  colleagues,	  however,	  he	  took	  the	  view	  that	  what	  was	  needed	  to	  prevent	  
extremism	  was	  tarshīd,	  guidance,	  not	  suppression.64	  	  As	  he	  explained	  in	  his	  essay,	  al-­‐Fiqh	  fī	  Marātib	  al-­‐
Aḥkām	  wa	  Adab	  al-­‐Khilāf	  [Jurisprudence	  in	  [Light	  of	  the	  Definitiveness	  of]	  Legal	  Rulings],	  the	  proper	  
antidote	  to	  both	  fanatic	  attachment	  to	  religious	  opinion	  and	  to	  confusion	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  
the	  laity	  when	  faced	  with	  numerous	  opinions	  on	  the	  same	  question	  of	  religious	  law	  was	  to	  educate	  
them	  about	  the	  role	  of	  interpretation	  in	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  and	  that	  differences	  of	  
opinion	  on	  the	  detailed	  questions	  of	  Islamic	  law	  are	  both	  inevitable	  and	  enriching	  to	  the	  community,	  not	  
contrary	  to	  its	  unity	  or	  the	  interests	  of	  Muslims.65	  	  	  
5. The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  Establishment	  Islam	  in	  Egypt	  
The	  previous	  discussion	  highlights	  the	  anxiety	  that	  establishment	  theologians	  experienced	  when	  
they	  witnessed	  the	  wave	  of	  religious	  pluralism	  that	  broke	  out	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  breakdown	  of	  Mubarak’s	  
authoritarian	  order.	  	  While	  these	  theologians	  do	  not	  explicitly	  name	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  as	  the	  
party	  responsible	  for	  the	  “chaos	  in	  religious	  discourse”	  affecting	  Egypt	  and	  other	  Muslim	  societies,	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  approach	  to	  religion	  and	  religious	  renewal,	  with	  its	  
populist	  focus,	  is	  a	  big	  part	  of	  the	  problem,	  and	  most	  definitely	  not	  part	  of	  the	  solution.	  	  Because	  the	  
Muslim	  Brotherhood	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  political	  actor	  using	  religion	  for	  its	  own	  partisan	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  	   Saḥwa	  Azhariyya,	  supra	  n.	  60	  (“ṭālaba	  ʿulamāʾ	  azhariyyūn	  fī	  miṣr	  al-­‐sulṭāt	  al-­‐miṣriyya	  bi-­‐qānūn	  yujarrim	  
fawḍā	  al-­‐fatāwā	  .	  .	  .	  wa	  akkadū	  anna	  ‘al-­‐azhar	  ḥasama	  amr	  jihat	  al-­‐fatwā	  wa	  manaḥa	  dār	  al-­‐iftāʾ	  al-­‐ḥaqq	  al-­‐waḥīd	  
fī	  iṣdār	  al-­‐fatwā	  fī’l-­‐bilād	  (Azharī	  scholars	  in	  Egypt	  have	  demanded	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  authorities	  promulgate	  a	  law	  
criminalizing	  the	  chaos	  in	  religious	  opinions	  .	  .	  .	  and	  they	  also	  affirmed	  that	  the	  Azhar	  has	  resolved	  the	  issue	  of	  
where	  religious	  opinions	  are	  to	  be	  obtained,	  and	  gave	  the	  Dar	  al-­‐Iftāʾ	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  issue	  religious	  opinions	  
in	  the	  country.)”).	  	  	  
	  
63	  	   Fawḍā	  al-­‐Khitāb	  al-­‐Dīnī,	  supra	  n.	  57	  (lā	  budda	  min	  qaṣr	  al-­‐amr	  ʿalā	  al-­‐mutakhaṣṣiṣīna	  min	  al-­‐ʿulamāʾ	  li’l-­‐
iftāʾ	  min	  khilāl	  al-­‐maʿāyīr	  allatī	  yanbaghī	  an	  tatawaffara	  fī	  man	  yataṣaddar	  li-­‐hādhihi	  al-­‐muhimma	  al-­‐ʿaẓīma).	  
	  
64	  	   Krämer,	  “Drawing	  Boundaries,”	  pp.	  199-­‐200,	  supra	  n.	  45.	  
	  
65	  	   Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī,	  al-­‐Fiqh	  fī	  Marātib	  al-­‐Aḥkām	  wa	  Adab	  al-­‐Khilāf,	  available	  at	  
http://qaradawi.net/new/library2/291-­‐2014-­‐01-­‐26-­‐18-­‐54-­‐35/3959-­‐	  (last	  viewed,	  November	  29,	  2015).	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interests	  (their	  opponents	  often	  contemptuously	  referred	  to	  them	  as	  tujjār	  al-­‐dīn	  (“merchants	  of	  
religion”)),	  establishment	  theologians	  worried	  that	  opposition	  to	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  as	  a	  political	  
party	  would	  translate	  into	  opposition	  to	  religion	  as	  such.66	  	  Just	  as	  worrisome,	  however,	  must	  have	  been	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  had	  its	  own	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  religious	  authority	  that	  was	  
independent	  of	  the	  established	  religious	  institutions	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  	  And	  despite	  the	  hue	  and	  cry	  
over	  various	  provisions	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  constitution	  of	  2012	  that	  secular	  critics	  claimed	  would	  empower	  
the	  Azhar	  to	  exercise	  a	  supervisory	  role	  over	  state	  legislation,	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  was	  largely	  
indifferent	  to	  the	  constitutional	  role	  of	  the	  Azhar	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  because	  “it	  controlled	  the	  
presidency	  and	  looked	  forward	  to	  a	  strong	  parliamentary	  role.	  .	  .	  .	  	  [I]t	  was	  happy	  to	  pursue	  Islamization	  
of	  the	  Egyptian	  legal	  order	  slowly	  —	  by	  legislation,	  for	  instance.”67	  
The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  preference	  for	  the	  democratically	  expressed	  will	  of	  the	  people	  as	  an	  
equally	  (if	  not	  more)	  legitimate	  interpretation	  of	  Islamic	  law	  manifested	  itself	  in	  an	  obscure	  controversy	  
that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  brief	  term	  of	  President	  Morsi	  when	  there	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  pass	  a	  law	  
authorizing	  the	  state	  to	  issue	  bonds	  that	  were	  in	  compliance	  with	  Islamic	  law,	  known	  as	  ṣukūk.	  	  The	  
government	  of	  Egypt,	  because	  of	  its	  financial	  crisis,	  was	  desperate	  to	  attract	  foreign	  capital.	  One	  
previously	  untapped	  source	  of	  funding	  had	  been	  Islamic	  finance,	  and	  although	  numerous	  jurisdictions	  
and	  private	  companies	  had	  tapped	  the	  Islamic	  finance	  market	  in	  the	  decade	  preceding	  the	  Egyptian	  
Revolution	  of	  2011,	  Egypt	  had	  not.	  	  One	  reason	  that	  Egypt	  had	  not	  sought	  to	  raise	  funds	  from	  this	  sector	  
was	  that	  the	  government	  had	  not	  promulgated	  a	  law	  that	  would	  enable	  it	  to	  issue	  such	  bonds	  which,	  
because	  of	  their	  non-­‐conventional,	  asset-­‐backed	  structure,	  required	  special	  legislation.	  	  The	  proposed	  
law	  intended	  to	  remedy	  this	  problem.	  	  	  
Islamic	  finance,	  including	  ṣukūk,	  however,	  is	  not	  free	  of	  controversy,	  with	  many	  Muslims	  critical	  
of	  these	  instruments	  as	  being	  subterfuges	  intended	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Islamic	  prohibition	  on	  interest-­‐
bearing	  loans.	  	  At	  the	  time	  the	  law	  was	  proposed,	  the	  2012	  Constitution	  had	  been	  approved,	  but	  the	  
House	  of	  Representatives,	  Majlis	  al-­‐Nuwwāb,	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  elected,	  it	  having	  been	  dissolved	  earlier	  
in	  the	  year	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Constitutional	  Court.	  As	  a	  result,	  only	  the	  second	  chamber	  of	  the	  Parliament,	  
the	  Majlis	  al-­‐Shūrā,	  was	  in	  session.	  	  For	  reasons	  not	  relevant	  here,	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  
more	  theologically	  conservative	  Salafī	  Nūr	  Party	  dominated	  membership	  of	  this	  chamber,	  but	  the	  
Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  Freedom	  and	  Justice	  Party	  held	  the	  majority	  of	  seats.	  	  The	  proposed	  Ṣukūk	  law	  
troubled	  the	  minority	  Salafis	  insofar	  as	  they	  believed	  it	  was	  an	  illegitimate	  attempt	  to	  circumvent	  Islamic	  
law’s	  prohibition	  on	  the	  payment	  of	  interest.	  	  They	  lacked	  sufficient	  votes	  in	  the	  Majlis	  al-­‐Shūrā	  to	  block	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  	   For	  example,	  the	  Egyptian	  Minister	  of	  Religious	  Endowments,	  has	  justified	  his	  Ministry’s	  attempt	  to	  
exercise	  direct	  control	  over	  all	  of	  Egypt’s	  mosques	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  coup	  partially	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  in	  the	  
polarized	  political	  atmosphere,	  political	  debates	  degenerate	  into	  incitements	  to	  violence	  and	  apostasy.	  	  Ahmed	  
Morsi	  and	  Nathan	  Brown,	  “Egypt’s	  al-­‐Azhar	  Steps	  Forward,”	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  Nov.	  7,	  
2013,	  available	  at	  http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/07/egypt-­‐s-­‐al-­‐azhar-­‐steps-­‐forward#.	  (Last	  viewed,	  
February	  14,	  2015).	  
	  
67	  	   Nathan	  Brown	  and	  Clark	  Lombardi,	  “Islam	  in	  Egypt’s	  New	  Constitution,”	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Dec.	  13,	  2012,	  
available	  at	  http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/13/islam-­‐in-­‐egypts-­‐new-­‐constitution/?wp_login_redirect=0.	  (Last	  




the	  law,	  however,	  so	  they	  invoked	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  new	  constitution	  which	  provided	  that	  the	  Council	  of	  
Senior	  Scholars	  of	  Azhar	  should	  be	  consulted	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  Islamic	  law	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  block	  or	  
modify	  the	  proposed	  law.68	  	  	  
The	  response	  of	  ʿIṣām	  al-­‐ʿAryān,	  representative	  of	  the	  majority	  Freedom	  and	  Justice	  Party,	  the	  
political	  wing	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  could	  not	  have	  been	  reassuring	  to	  the	  religious	  establishment.	  
Despite	  language	  in	  the	  2012	  Constitution	  which	  provided	  that	  “the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Senior	  Council	  of	  
Scholars	  of	  Azhar	  is	  taken	  [into	  account]	  in	  matters	  connected	  to	  Islamic	  law,”69	  al-­‐ʿAryān	  stated	  that	  this	  
provision,	  in	  fact,	  did	  not	  make	  the	  Azhar	  the	  exclusive	  or	  final	  adjudicator	  on	  the	  law’s	  conformity	  with	  
Islamic	  teachings.	  	  Rather,	  the	  provision	  merely	  authorized	  the	  parliament,	  in	  its	  capacity	  as	  sole	  
lawmaker,	  or	  the	  justices	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Constitutional	  Court,	  in	  its	  capacity	  as	  supervisor	  of	  the	  
constitutionality	  of	  legislation,	  to	  consult	  with	  Azhar’s	  senior	  scholars	  when	  each	  body	  is	  exercising	  its	  
constitutionally	  delegated	  functions,	  namely	  law-­‐making,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  parliament,	  and	  judicial	  review,	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Constitutional	  Court.	  	  In	  each	  case,	  however,	  it	  was	  the	  right,	  not	  the	  duty,	  of	  
these	  bodies	  to	  consult	  with	  the	  Azhar,	  a	  right	  that	  could	  only	  be	  exercised	  when	  a	  majority	  of	  each	  
body	  chooses	  to	  solicit	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Azhar	  on	  the	  matter	  that	  is	  under	  debate.70	  	  President	  Morsi,	  
in	  response	  to	  political	  pressure	  from	  the	  Salafis	  and	  demands	  from	  al-­‐Azhar,	  however,	  eventually	  
relented,	  and	  sent	  the	  bill	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  Senior	  Scholars	  of	  Azhar	  for	  their	  review,71	  and	  in	  their	  
first	  review	  of	  the	  draft,	  they	  rejected	  it.72	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  	   Ibid.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  debate	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  Majlis	  al-­‐Shūrā,	  see	  Aḥmad	  Sāmī	  Mutawallī	  et	  
al.,	  Jadal	  bi’l-­‐Shūrā	  Hawl	  Musammā	  Qānūn	  al-­‐Ṣukūk	  wa	  ʿAdam	  ʿArḍihī	  ʿalā	  Kibār	  al-­‐ʿUlamāʾ;	  al-­‐ʿAryān:	  al-­‐Barlamān	  
Yakhtaṣṣ	  bi’l-­‐Tashrīʿ	  wa’l-­‐Dustūriyya	  Turāqib	  al-­‐Qawānīn	  [Debate	  Around	  the	  Nomenclature	  in	  the	  Ṣukūk	  Law	  and	  
Whether	  it	  Should	  be	  Reviewed	  by	  the	  Councils	  of	  Senior	  Scholars	  [of	  Azhar];	  al-­‐ʿAryān:	  Parliament	  is	  Responsible	  
for	  Making	  Laws	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Constitutional	  Court	  Supervises	  Whether	  They	  are	  Constitutional],	  al-­‐Ahrām,	  
March	  8,	  2013,	  available	  at	  http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/137308.aspx.	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  14,	  2015).	  
	  
69	  	   Art.	  4,	  Egyptian	  Constitution	  of	  2012,	  available	  at	  
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/final_dreaft_of_constitution_as_of_30_nov_2012.pdf	  (Arabic,	  	  
last	  viewed,	  February	  14,	  2015).	  	  An	  English	  translation	  is	  available	  at	  
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/final_constitution_30_nov_2012_-­‐english-­‐_-­‐idea.pdf.	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  
14,	  2015).	  
	  
70	  	   “Al-­‐Radd	  ʿalā	  al-­‐Kadhdhābīn	  Alladhīna	  Yaqūlūna	  Inna	  al-­‐Azhar	  Huwa	  Man	  Kāna	  Yufassir	  al-­‐Sharīʿa	  fī	  
Dustūr	  2012	  [A	  Reply	  to	  the	  Liars	  Who	  Say	  That	  the	  Azhar	  Had	  the	  Authority	  to	  Interpret	  Islamic	  Law	  in	  the	  2012	  
Constitution],	  available	  at	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m7Nui4dIQmU.	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  14,	  2015)	  
(ʿIṣām	  al-­‐ʿAryān	  giving	  a	  speech	  in	  the	  Majlis	  al-­‐Shūrā	  denying	  the	  obligation	  to	  submit	  proposed	  legislation	  to	  the	  
Azhar	  for	  review	  to	  assure	  its	  conformity	  with	  Islamic	  law,	  and	  affirming	  that	  all	  powers	  exercised	  by	  the	  
government	  come	  from	  the	  Egyptian	  people).	  
	  
71	  	   Mursī	  Yuḥīl	  Mashrūʿ	  al-­‐Ṣukūk	  al-­‐Islāmiyya	  ilā	  al-­‐Azhar	  li-­‐Ibdāʾ	  al-­‐Raʾy	  fīhi	  [Morsi	  Refers	  the	  Islamic	  Bonds	  
Bill	  to	  the	  Azhar	  so	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  It	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  its	  Opinion],	  Īlāf,	  April	  2,	  2013,	  available	  at	  
http://elaph.com/Web/news/2013/3/802758.html	  (last	  viewed,	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  29,	  2015).	  
	  
72	  	   Hayʾat	  Kibār	  al-­‐ʿUlamāʾ	  Tarfuḍ	  Mashrūʿ	  al-­‐Ṣukūk	  [Council	  of	  Senior	  Scholars	  of	  Azhar	  Rejects	  the	  Islamic	  
Bonds	  Bill],	  Muhammad	  ʿAbd	  al-­‐Shakūr	  and	  Mahmud	  Fayid,	  al-­‐Wafd,	  April	  11,	  2013,	  available	  at	  
	  26	  
	  
Whether	  or	  not	  the	  Muslim	  religious	  establishment	  chose	  to	  support	  the	  coup	  was	  a	  result	  of	  a	  
simple	  calculation	  based	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  power,	  or	  a	  principled	  opposition	  to	  the	  politicization	  of	  
religious	  debate	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  religious	  divisions	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  indisputable	  that	  the	  Azhar,	  as	  a	  
religious	  institution,	  emerged	  much	  more	  powerful	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  coup	  than	  it	  was	  in	  the	  Islamic	  
republican	  model	  being	  developed	  by	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.73	  	  The	  de	  facto	  power	  of	  the	  Azhar	  as	  
the	  religious	  authority	  for	  Muslims	  in	  Egypt	  was	  rendered	  de	  jure	  by	  the	  2013	  Constitution.	  	  Article	  7	  of	  
the	  amended	  constitution,	  while	  it	  removed	  any	  reference	  to	  a	  role	  for	  the	  Senior	  Council	  of	  Azhar	  
Scholars	  in	  lawmaking,	  recognized	  the	  Azhar	  as	  the	  “primary	  authority	  (al-­‐marjiʿ	  al-­‐asāsī)”	  for	  the	  
articulation	  and	  supervision	  of	  Islam	  in	  Egypt.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  coup,	  then,	  the	  Muslim	  religious	  
establishment	  emerged	  not	  only	  with	  institutional	  independence	  from	  the	  state,	  but	  also	  what	  could	  
reasonably	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  exclusive	  legal	  authority	  for	  the	  teaching	  and	  supervision	  of	  Islam	  in	  
Egypt.74	  
6. Conclusion	  
From	  a	  liberal	  perspective,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  view	  constitutional	  battles	  in	  Egypt	  from	  the	  perspective	  
western	  history,	  a	  history	  that	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  battle	  between	  the	  powerful	  institutions	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  Church,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  European	  monarchs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  A	  simplistic	  attempt	  to	  
apply	  this	  model	  of	  religion-­‐state	  relations	  to	  the	  Arab	  world	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  cast	  much	  light	  on	  the	  actual	  
dynamics	  of	  the	  current	  struggle	  taking	  place	  insofar	  as	  there	  is	  no	  religious	  institution	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  
that	  plays	  a	  political	  role	  that	  would	  be	  comparable	  to	  that	  played	  by	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  European	  
political	  history.	  	  Instead,	  one	  is	  witnessing	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  battle	  taking	  place,	  one	  in	  which	  the	  
question	  is	  how	  religion	  should	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  state	  and	  practiced	  in	  society:	  should	  it	  be	  subject	  
to	  a	  state	  monopoly,	  or	  should	  a	  religiously	  pluralistic	  public	  sphere	  be	  tolerated,	  one	  which	  would	  
include	  not	  only	  “moderate”	  conceptions	  of	  religion	  which	  are	  consistent	  with	  state	  policies,	  but	  also	  
“radical”	  or	  “extremist”	  conceptions	  of	  religion	  which	  challenge	  the	  state’s	  religious	  message,	  whether	  
from	  within	  a	  religious	  discourse	  that	  finds	  the	  state’s	  religious	  policies	  too	  lax,	  for	  example,	  or	  from	  an	  
atheistic	  perspective	  that	  rejects	  religion	  altogether	  and	  finds	  the	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  promulgate	  a	  
state-­‐sanctioned	  version	  of	  religious	  orthodoxy	  oppressive.75	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  (last	  viewed,	  
November	  29,	  2015).	  
	  
73	  	   Al-­‐Azhar	  Steps	  Forward,	  supra	  n.	  27	  (“al-­‐Azhar	  is	  now	  leading	  Egypt’s	  religious	  establishment	  into	  a	  new	  
era.	  Traditional	  rival	  institutions	  have	  been	  brought	  into	  far	  tighter	  coordination,	  and	  the	  grand	  sheikh	  and	  the	  
Council	  of	  Senior	  Scholars	  stand	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  more	  unified	  apparatus.).	  
	  
74	  	   Al-­‐Azhar	  al-­‐Sharīf	  .	  .	  .	  al-­‐Marjiʿ	  al-­‐Asāsī	  fī’l-­‐ʿUlūm	  al-­‐Dīniyya	  wa’l-­‐Shuʾūn	  al-­‐Islāmiyya	  (“The	  Noble	  Azhar	  is	  
the	  primary	  authority	  for	  religious	  learning	  and	  Islamic	  affairs.”).	  Art.	  7,	  Egyptian	  Constitution	  of	  2013,	  available	  at	  
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/final_constitution_-­‐2_dec_2013-­‐arabic-­‐_signed.pdf.	  (Last	  viewed,	  February	  
14,	  2015).	  	  An	  English	  translation	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/dustor-­‐en001.pdf.	  (Last	  
viewed,	  February	  14,	  2015).	  
	  
75	  	   One	  of	  the	  ironies	  of	  the	  coup	  has	  been	  that	  the	  new	  President	  of	  Egypt	  has,	  in	  addition	  to	  outlawing	  the	  
Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  declaring	  it	  a	  terrorist	  organization,	  has	  launched	  a	  very	  public	  campaign	  confronting	  the	  
	  27	  
	  
	   While	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  liberal	  movement,	  its	  conception	  of	  religion	  
and	  its	  role	  in	  politics	  is	  tolerant	  –	  even	  if	  grudgingly	  –	  of	  pluralism	  in	  the	  religious	  public	  sphere.	  This	  
practical	  toleration,	  even	  if	  born	  of	  necessity	  and	  not	  principle,	  produced,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  recent	  
Egyptian	  history,	  a	  genuinely	  pluralistic	  public	  sphere	  in	  which	  religious	  topics	  could	  be	  freely	  debated	  in	  
public	  and	  in	  an	  arguably	  civil	  spirit.76	  	  In	  the	  language	  of	  Jeffry	  Stout,	  the	  January	  25th	  Revolution	  
produced,	  even	  if	  for	  only	  a	  relatively	  brief	  period	  of	  time,	  a	  substantially	  more	  secularized,	  but	  not	  
secular,	  public	  space	  in	  Egypt.77	  	  In	  a	  secularized	  public	  space,	  appeals	  to	  religious	  arguments	  decline	  not	  
because	  the	  citizens	  necessarily	  lose	  religious	  faith,	  but	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  increasingly	  
pluralistic	  theologies	  of	  citizens	  themselves,	  and	  the	  increasing	  realization	  that	  religious	  arguments,	  
because	  of	  their	  malleability,	  are	  inconclusive	  for	  political	  purposes.	  	  In	  response,	  citizens	  resort	  to	  
other,	  non-­‐theological,	  rhetorical	  strategies	  in	  attempts	  to	  forge	  broader	  agreement,	  not	  because	  they	  
have	  suddenly	  become	  non-­‐believers,	  but	  rather	  because	  they	  realize	  that	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  assume	  
deep	  agreement	  on	  theological	  principles.	  	  Something	  akin	  to	  this	  process	  was	  clearly	  taking	  place	  in	  
post-­‐Mubarak	  Egypt,	  and	  Egypt’s	  Muslim	  religious	  establishment	  (and	  probably	  its	  Coptic	  counterpart	  as	  
well)	  found	  these	  developments	  quite	  dangerous.	  	  Their	  support	  of	  a	  military	  coup	  was	  likely	  motivated	  
by	  a	  desire	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  increasing	  secularization	  of	  the	  religious	  public	  square	  that	  took	  place	  
following	  the	  Jan.	  25th	  Revolution,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  the	  political	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood	  only	  served	  to	  accelerate,	  and	  that	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  competitive	  politics	  would	  
only	  further	  entrench	  as	  different	  conceptions	  of	  religion	  and	  the	  state	  would	  be	  articulated	  in	  the	  
course	  of	  political	  competition.	  	  	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  Islamic	  tradition,	  the	  state	  was	  supposed	  to	  protect	  
both	  religious	  orthodoxy	  and	  act	  in	  a	  representative	  capacity.	  	  In	  modern	  circumstances,	  however,	  it	  
cannot	  act	  in	  a	  representative	  fashion	  without	  weakening	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  religious	  
orthodoxy.	  	  While	  advocates	  of	  republican	  Islam	  such	  as	  al-­‐Qaraḍāwī	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  overly	  fearful	  of	  
the	  spread	  of	  heterodoxy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  democratization,	  traditionalist	  theologians	  such	  as	  ʿAlī	  Jumuʿa	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“threat”	  of	  atheism.	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  Mona	  Eltahawy,	  “Egypt’s	  War	  on	  Atheism,”	  Jan.	  27,	  2015,	  N.Y.	  Times,	  
available	  at	  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/opinion/mona-­‐eltahawy-­‐egypts-­‐war-­‐on-­‐atheism.html?_r=0	  
(last	  viewed,	  February	  15,	  2015);	  Louisa	  Loveluck,	  “Egypt’s	  Sisi	  Urges	  Religious	  Moderation,	  But	  No	  Space	  for	  
Insulting	  Images,”	  Jan.	  14,	  2015,	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor,	  available	  at	  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-­‐
East/2015/0114/Egypt-­‐s-­‐Sisi-­‐urges-­‐religious-­‐moderation-­‐but-­‐no-­‐space-­‐for-­‐insulting-­‐images	  (last	  viewed,	  February	  
15,	  2015);	  Brian	  Whitaker,	  “Sisi’s	  Egypt	  to	  Eliminate	  Atheism,”	  June	  19,	  2014,	  albab.com,	  available	  at	  
http://www.al-­‐bab.com/blog/2014/may-­‐june/egypt-­‐to-­‐eliminate-­‐atheism.htm#sthash.AZIDvDPu.8RUyMIn8.dpbs	  
(last	  viewed,	  February	  15,	  2015);	  Marwa	  Morgan,	  “Sisi’s	  Quest	  to	  Maintain	  ‘Moral	  Discipline’	  Returning	  Egypt	  to	  
Authoritarianism,”	  Jan.	  12,	  2015,	  Alakhbar	  English,	  available	  at	  http://english.al-­‐akhbar.com/node/23169	  (last	  
viewed,	  February	  15,	  2015);	  and	  Sarah	  Lynch,	  “In	  Egypt,	  Atheists	  Considered	  a	  ‘Dangerous’	  Development,”	  USA	  
Today,	  Feb.	  2,	  2015,	  available	  at	  http://www.religionnews.com/2015/02/02/egypt-­‐atheists-­‐considered-­‐dangerous-­‐
development/	  (last	  viewed,	  February	  15,	  2015).	  	  	  
	  
76	  	   Kristin	  Deasy,	  “Debating	  Atheism	  in	  the	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have	  clearly	  decided	  that	  protection	  of	  religious	  orthodoxy	  is	  more	  important	  than	  establishing	  a	  
representative	  government.	  	  In	  making	  this	  choice,	  they	  are	  clearly	  vindicating	  a	  well-­‐established	  line	  of	  
reasoning	  in	  Islamic	  political	  thought.	  	  The	  Muslim	  religious	  establishment	  of	  Egypt	  believes	  that	  in	  Sisi	  it	  
has	  found	  the	  pious	  autocrat	  idealized	  by	  pre-­‐modern	  Muslim	  theologians	  such	  as	  al-­‐Ghazali,	  and	  from	  
their	  perspective,	  a	  religious	  autocrat	  who	  can	  control	  religious	  debate	  is	  preferable	  to	  a	  religious	  
president	  presiding	  over	  a	  political	  system	  in	  which	  religious	  teachings	  become	  a	  subject	  of	  public	  
contestation.	  Whether,	  however,	  this	  strategy	  can	  provide	  long-­‐term	  political	  and	  theological	  stability	  
for	  Egypt	  and	  other	  Muslim-­‐majority	  countries,	  is	  questionable.	  	  For	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  however,	  
the	  future	  looks	  bleak	  for	  any	  kind	  of	  republican	  Islam	  to	  become	  ascendant	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  turn	  
of	  the	  religious	  establishment	  to	  try	  to	  create	  a	  stable	  resolution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  state-­‐religion	  
relations	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
